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Independent Orbiter Assessment 
Assessment of the Auxiliary Power Unit FMEA/CIL 
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in 
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of 
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items 
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE 
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the 
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions 
for Prenaration of FME A and CIL. 10 October 1986. 
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Auxiliary Power 
Unit (APU) hardware, generating draft failure modes and poten- 
tial critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was 
accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within 
the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then 
compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L 
updates included. A resolution of each discrepancy from the 
comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. 
This report documents the results of that comparison for the 
Orbiter APU hardware. 
The IOA product for the APU analysis, covering both APU hardware 
and APU electrical components, consisted of 344 failure mode 
"worksheets" (301 original worksheets plus 43 supplemental 
worksheets) that resulted in 178 potential critical items being 
identified (149 original items plus 29 supplemental items). A 
comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA APU hardware 
FMEA/CIL baseline dated 17 December 1986 which consisted of 184 
FMEAs and fifty-seven CIL items. The comparison determined if 
there were any results which had been found by the IOA analysis 
of the APU hardware that did not agree with the NASA APU hardware 
baseline. The comparison identified seventy-two discrepancies. 
After discussion with the NASA subsystem manager, this list was 
reduced to nineteen issues which were taken by the subsystem 
manager to the NASA/Rockwell F'MEA/CIL working group meetings for 
disposition. As a result of that review, four additional APU 
hardware FMEAS recommended by the IOA were added to the NASA 
proposed FMEA/CIL baseline, three of which were CIL items. 
A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA proposed APU 
Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPDC) CIL baseline 
dated 10 July 1987 which consisted of forty-five CIL items. The 
comparison identified nine discrepancies, which were provided to 
the NASA/Rockwell FMEA/CIL working group meetings for 
consideration. As a result of this review, all nine issues were 
resolved without adding any additional CIL's to the proposed NASA 
APU EPDC CIL baseline. 
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A comparison was made of the IOA product to the NASA proposed APU 
EPDC FMEA baseline dated 2 October 1987, which consisted of 124 
FMEAs and forty-eight CIL items. 
identified as a result of this cornparison. 
No discrepancies were 
It should be noted that while this FMEA baseline package fully 
documented the forty-eight APU EPDC CIL items, allowing a 
thorough comparison, it provided only hardware item 
identification, failure mode, and criticality for the seventy-six 
non-CIL FMEAs. Assessment of these non-CIL FMEAs was done as 
well as it could be under the circumstances. 
Figure 1 presents a comparison of the proposed post 51-L NASA 
baseline with the IOA recommended baseline and any issues. The 
number of IOA FMEAs and CIL items shown differ from those of the 
original analysis because they take into account the IOA/NASA 
discrepancies which were resolved before the twenty-eight issues 
(nineteen hardware issues and nine EPDC issues) shown were 
generated. As the numbers imply, not all issues involve adding 
or removing FMEAs or CIL items. Some involve changing 
criticalities or redundancy screens of existing FMEAs. The two 
remaining IOA issues shown are discussed in Section 4. 
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FIGURE 1 - APU FMEA/CIL ASSESSmTU'T . PAGE IS ORIGINAL 
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2 . 0  INTRODUCTION 
2 . 1  Purpose 
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress 
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the 
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has 
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space 
Shuttle design. 
of the proposed Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and 
technical accuracy. 
The MDAC is providing an independent assessment 
2 . 2  scope 
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity 
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware 
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment 
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses 
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and 
operational requirements for all mission phases. 
2 . 3  Analysis Approach 
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis 
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem 
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item 
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These 
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report, 
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime' 
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in 
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the 
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is 
documented in this report. 
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization 
1.1 Define subsystem functions 
1.2 Define subsystem components 
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and 
assumptions 
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram 
2.1 Define subsystem 
2.2 Define major assemblies 
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations 
Step 3.0 Failure events definition 
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes 
3.2 Document IOA analysis results 
4 
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL 
4.1 Resolve differences 
4.2 Review in-house 
4.3 Document assessment issues 
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager 
2 .4  Ground Rules and Assumptions 
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined in 
Appendix B. 
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
3.1 Design and Function 
The Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) subsystem converts chemical 
energy stored in liquid hydrazine to mechanical shaft 
power. The Orbiter has three completely independent APUs, 
with each APU driving one hydraulic pump. 
Each APU subsystem consists of the following: 
0 A fuel supply and distribution system 
0 
0 An exhaust duct assembly 
0 A fuel thermal control system 
o A fuel pump seal cavity drain line 
o 
o 
The hydrazine is delivered to the APU gas generator via the 
fuel pump. 
hydrazine to decompose. 
through the turbine, which in turn provides mechanical power 
to the APU gearbox. Through gear reduction, power is 
provided to drive the APU fuel pump, lube oil pump, and 
hydraulic oil pump. 
An auxiliary power unit and controller 
A fuel pump/valve module cooling system 
A gas generator injector cooling system 
The catalyst in the gas generator causes the 
The hot gases make two passes 
Three water tanks and associ-ated lines are provided to cool 
the fuel pumps and gas generator valve modules after APU 
shutdown on-orbit and to cool the gas generator injectors 
should an emergency hot start be required. 
The hydrazine fuel supply is stored in the fuel tank and is 
pressurized with nitrogen during servicing. 
provides start capability until the fuel pump is running and 
acts against the tank diaphragm to positively expel fuel to 
the APU. The fuel pump provides a constant flow of 
hydrazine to the valve module after the initial bootstrap 
start. 
The pressure 
Two parallel fuel isolation valves are manually actuated by 
the crew during APU activation and deactivation. 
nonoperating periods, they isolate the fuel supply to 
prevent further fuel flow. Each valve has a reverse-flow 
pressure-relief feature to prevent system damage due to 
expansion of fuel trapped between the valves and the APU. 
During 
The APU turbine speed is controlled by the Gas Generator 
Valve Module (GGVM). The valve module consists of two 
flapper-type valves in series. 
valve downstream of the pump is normally open and allows 
flow to the secondary or shutoff valve. The secondary valve 
is normally in by-pass, which directs hydrazine flow back to 
the pump inlet. In the powered state, it allows hydrazine 
flow to the gas generator. The APU controller cycles these 
The primary or modulating 
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valves to maintain proper turbine speed. The gas generator 
is a container for a granular catalyst. When hydrazine 
comes in contact with the catalyst, decomposition occurs, 
and the hot gases produced are directed to the turbine. 
The dual-pass turbine assembly converts hot gas kinetic 
energy into mechanical shaft power at the desired speeds to 
operate the hydraulic pump, lube oil pump, and fuel pump. 
The speed-reducing gearbox contains gears, bearings, seals, 
and a scavenger lubrication system. The gearbox is 
pressurized with nitrogen to prevent vaporization of the 
lubricant. A lube oil pump circulates the lube oil to the 
hydraulic water boiler for cooling. The gearbox has a 
pressurization system consisting of a small GN2 bottle and 
solenoid shutoff valve actuated by the controller. 
The APU controller provides speed control, logic for APU 
startup and shutdown, signal conditioning, heater control, 
gearbox pressure control, and malfunction detection 
capability. 
The exhaust duct assembly directs the APU exhaust products 
overboard through an exit at the upper aft fuselage skin. 
Exhaust duct assemblies 1 and 2 are located on the port side 
and duct 3 is on the starboard side of the aft fuselage at 
the base of the vertical stabilizer. 
The fuel tank, fuel line, fuel pump, and lube oil line 
heaters are sized to maintain the fuel and lube oil above 
minimum temperature during any Orbiter mission. 
generator heaters provide a means of preheating the catalyst 
to > 190 degrees F for controlled decomposition. 
Insulation for the APU prevents excessive temperatures in 
the fuel system as a result of entry heating. 
The gas 
The fuel pump and gas generator valve modules are maintained 
below 200 degrees F a f t e r  APU shutdown by a water spray 
system consisting of two water tanks and associated lines, 
switches, thermostats, and timers. This system is only 
required on-orbit when convective cooling is insufficient to 
cool these components. 
A single water tank with lines to all three APUs is provided 
to cool the gas generator injector should an APU restart be 
required before the gas generator can cool naturally. 
Control is via the APU controller. 
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3.2 Interfaces and Locations 
Figure 2 depicts the APU interfaces. 
Controller receive electric power from various Orbiter Aft 
Load Controllers, Aft Power Controllers, Control Buses, and 
Essential Buses. 
015 . 
The APU and APU 
APU gauges are powered by Panel Bus Main B 
All three A W s  are mounted on the 1307 bulkhead, in the 
Orbiter aft compartment. 
proximity toward the port side of the bulkhead. 
slightly further away, toward the starboard side. 
The APU fuel tanks are mounted on the sides of the aft 
compartment, about 7 feet aft of the 1307 bulkhead. Tanks 
1 and 2 are on the port side, in close proximity. Tank 3 is 
on the starboard side. 
three APUs and associated fuel tanks, fuel lines, and the 
lube oil lines. 
APUs 1 and 2 are located in close 
APU 3 is 
Figure 3 shows the locations of the 
APU lube oil cooling is provided by the Orbiter Water Spray 
Boilers, one for each APU. 
The Controllers for APU 1, 2 and 3 are mounted on freon 
coldplates in Aft Avionics Bays 4, 5 and 6, respectively. 
The APUs are controlled during flight by flight crew 
switches only - no uplink commands are possible. 
functions can be controlled from the ground prelaunch by way 
of the Launch Aft MDM, however. 
Many APU 
3.3 Functional Breakdown 
For analysis purposes, the APU was broken down into the 
following functional subsystems: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5 .  
6 .  
7 .  
8 .  
9. 
10. 
Power System 
Fuel System 
Lube Oil System 
Gas Generator Injector Cooling System 
Fuel Pump/GGVM Cooling System 
Structure 
Electrical System 
Displays 
Instrumentation 
Controller 
These subsystems are described below. 
1. The Power System consists of the components involved in 
generating shaft power from the exothermic reaction - 
the gas generator, turbine wheel, exhaust duct, 
gearbox, gas generator bed heaters, and the turbine 
speed sensors. 
8 
I 
I 
1 
a 
W 
0 
Q 
v1 
d 
z 
c3 
u) 
a 
- 
t= 
{ ,  
E Z  
Figure 2 - APU INTERFACES 
9 
A I 
Figure 3 - APU LOCATION 
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2 .  
3. 
4 .  
5 .  
6 .  
7 .  
a. 
9. 
10. 
The Fuel System consists of all components involved in 
storing fuel, and supplying it to the gas generator - 
the fuel tank, fuel lines, valves, fuel pump, and 
heaters. 
The Lube Oil System includes the lube oil lines, pump, 
couplings, accumulators, and heaters. 
The Gas Generator Injector Cooling System includes all 
valves, water tanks, water lines, couplings, and 
heaters associated with this cooling system. 
The Fuel Pump/GGVM Cooling System includes all valves, 
water tanks, water lines, nitrogen lines, couplings, 
and heaters associated with this cooling system. 
The Structures analyzed include the APU turbine and 
gearbox housings. 
The Electrical System includes circuitry specifically 
associated with the APU, including the APU switches. 
Displays include all APU gauges and talkbacks. 
Instrumentation includes all APU transducers except 
for the turbine speed sensors, which are covered under 
the Power System. 
The APU Controller was analyzed to the functional level 
only. 
of the Controller's important functions. 
The analysis examines the consequences of loss 
Figure 4 presents a highly simplified breakdown of the APU 
components, reflecting the functional subsystems described 
above (except for the structures, electrical, displays, and 
instrumentation subsystems) .. 
Figure 5 presents the top-level hierarchy used in the APU 
analysis. 
Figures 6 through 15 present the breakdown hierarchy of the 
ten APU subsystems described above. 
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Figure 12 - ELECTRICAL SYSTEM HIERARCHY 
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4.0  ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
The IOA analysis of the APU subsystem initially generated 301 
failure mode worksheets and identified 149 Potential Critical 
Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. In order to 
facilitate comparison, forty-three additional failure mode analysis 
worksheets were generated. These analysis results were compared 
to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline (17 December 1986) of 184 
FMEAs and fifty-seven CIL items, and to the proposed NASA Post 
51-L EPDC baseline (10 July 1987) of 120 FMEAS and forty-five CIL 
items. The discrepancy in the number of IOA and NASA FMEAs is 
due to the different approaches used by NASA and IOA to group 
failure modes. Upon completion of the assessment, and after a 
discussion with the NASA subsystem manager, nineteen hardware 
issues were carried to the NASA/Rockwell FMEA/CIL working group 
for consideration. These nineteen issues resulted in four new 
F'MEAs being added to the NASA hardware FMEA baseline. An 
assessment of the EPDC CIL items produced nine issues which were 
provided to the NASA/Rockwell FMEA/CIL working group for 
consideration. These nine issues were resolved satisfactorily 
without adding any FMEAs to the NASA APU EPDC baseline. 
The assessment report divides the APU into the same ten 
subsystems used in the analysis report. 
subsystem corresponds to the NASA APU EPDC FMEAs. 
At the completion of the assessment, there are two remaining IOA 
issues. One involves the APU instrumentation, and is a carryover 
from the original nineteen hardware issues. 
issue which arose as a result of a discrepancy identified between 
the APU hardware and APU EPDC FMEA criticalities. These two 
issues are discussed in Sections 4.9 and 4.7, respectively. 
The IOA electrical 
The other is a new 
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each 
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the 
NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix 
E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous 
analysis results reported in Space Transportation System 
Engineering and Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper No. 
1.0-WP-VA86001-14, Analysis of the Auxiliary Power Unit, 12 
December 1986. Appendix F provides a cross-reference between the 
NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA 
recommendations are also summarized. 
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TOTAL 
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the 
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented 
in Table I. 
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Table I SUMMARY OF IOA FMEA ASSESSMENT 
Component 
Power 
Fuel 
Lube Oil 
GG Injector 
Cooling 
FP/GGVM Cooling 
Structure 
Electrical 
Displays 
Instrumentation 
Controller 
NASA 
12 
51 
16 
16 
21 
12 0 
8 
48 
12 
- 
I 
IOA 
12 
54 
22 
16 
21 
1 
12 1 
8 
49 
12 
I 
Issues 
316 I 28 
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the 
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented 
in Table 11. 
Table I1 SUMMARY OF IOA CIL ASSESSMENT 
Component 
Power 
Fuel 
Lube Oil 
GG Injector 
Cooling 
FP/GGVM Cooling 
Structure 
Electrical 
Displays 
Instrumentation 
Controller 
TOTAL 
NASA I IOA I Issues 
8 
29 
6 
8 
- - 
45 - - 
6 
8 
31 
8 
8 
- 
1 
39 - - 
6 
102 I 101 I 25 
25 
Table I11 presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure 
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline. Further 
discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable 
failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs. 
Table I11 SUMMARY OF IOA RECOMMENDED FAILURE CRITICALITIES 
Criticality: 
Power 
Fuel 
Lube oil 
GG Injector 
Cooling 
FP/GGVM Cooling 
Structure 
Electrical 
Displays 
Instrumentation 
Controller 
TOTAL 10 
2/1R 
4 
21 
5 - 
- 
1 
11 - - 
4 
46 
3/1R 
2 
14 
6 - 
- - 
39 
5 
5 
- 
71 
3/2R 
17 
2 
3 - 
31 
3/3 
3 
7 
8 
16 
21 
50 
6 '  
41 
3 
- 
155 
TOTAL 
12 
54 
22 
16 
21 
1 
12 1 
. 8  
49 
12 
316 
Of the failure modes analyzed, 101 were determined to be critical 
items. A summary of the I O A  recommended critical items is 
presented in Tabje IV. 
Table IV SUMMARY OF IOA RECOMMENDED CRITICAL ITEMS 
~~ 
Criticality: 
Power 
Fuel 
Lube Oil 
GG Injector 
Cooling 
FP/GGVM Cooling 
Structure 
Electrical 
Displays 
Instrumentation 
Controller 
TOTAL 
8 
31 
8 
8 
- 
1 
39 - - 
6 
26 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Power 
Fuel 
Lube oil 
GG Injector 
FP/GGVM Cooling 
Cooling 
Structure 
Electrical 
Displays 
Controller 
Instrumentation 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
APU-100 to APU-114 
APU-115 to APU-186, APU-401X, APU-402X 
APU-187 to APU-223, APU-403X 
APU-224 to APU-245, APU-404X 
APU-246 to APU-275, APU-405X 
APU-276 to APU-279 
APU-280 to APU-363, APU-406X to APU-411X, 
APU-364 to APU-373 
APU-379 to APU-400, APU-418X, APU-419X 
APU-420X to APU-443X 
APU-375 to APU-378, APU-412X to APU-417X 
I 
I 
1 
The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis 
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V. 
4.1 Power Subsystem Assessment Results 
The first assessment between the fourteen IOA failure modes and 
the Post 51-L NASA FMEA baseline produced one issue. This issue 
was an external leak in the exhaust duct bellows (MDAC ID 105). 
The IOA listed this as a separate failure mode, based’on the NSTS 
22206 rule concerning special lines (paragraph 2.3.7.c). In a 
meeting held on 29 January 1987, the NASA subsystem manager 
asserted that this rule did not apply to the APU exhaust duct, 
since it does not flex or bend while operating. He felt that the 
existing exhaust duct leakage failure mode was sufficient (FMEA 
04-2-L4-11). The IOA agreed to accept this reasoning. 
4.2 Fuel Subsystem Assessment Results 
The IOA analysis generated seventy-four failure modes for this 
subsystem (seventy-two original failure modes plus two 
supplemental failure modes). The initial assessment between the 
IOA failure modes and the Post-51L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline 
produced thirty-one issues, including separate failure modes 
for Inspecial lines1@ (MDAC ID 178), external leaks from additional 
components (MDAC ID 117, 129, 144, 150, 175, and 183), a higher 
criticality for fuel heaters and thermostats failing off (MDAC ID 
160, 161, 163, 164, 166, 171, 172, 401X, and 402X), disagreements 
about redundancy screens (MDAC ID 136, 153, 158, 174, 184, and 
185), failure modes not covered by the NASA FMEA baseline (MDAC 
ID 134 and 143), and various other differences (MDAC ID 127, 155, 
170, 176, 177, 180, and 181). 
The meeting with the NASA subsystem manager on 29 January 1987 
resulted in seven issues which the subsystem manager felt should 
be considered by the APU FMEA/CIL review working group. These 
seven issues were failure modes of the fuel pump (MDAC ID 134 and 
27 
I 
I 
! 
136), fuel line couplings (MDAC ID 153 and 158), fuel line filter 
(MDAC ID 174), and fuel pump seal cavity drain system (MDAC ID 
178 and 183). The IOA recommended that failure modes be added 
for the fuel pump relief valve failing to relieve, for a leak in 
the seal cavity drain flex hose, and for an external leak from 
the seal cavity drain relief valve. The fuel pump relief valve 
failure mode was determined by the APU FMEA/CIL review working 
group to have no effect on the APU. The two seal cavity drain 
July 1987. 
The IOA recommended that redundancy screen A be passed for the 
fuel line quick-disconnect coupling, fuel pump filter, and fuel 
line filter failure modes, since the prelaunch APU run time 
constitutes checkout of the fuel filters for blockage, and the 
fuel couplings are capable of checkout by removing their caps. 
The APU FMEA/CIL review working group did not feel that the 
prelaunch run time constituted checkout of the fuel filters, and 
the NASA opinion concerning checkout of quick-disconnect 
couplings is that if the quick-disconnect itself is not leaking, 
then there is no way to verify that the cap will not leak. 
IOA agrees with this reasoning. 
4.3 Lube Oil Subsystem Assessment Results 
During the initial assessment, thirty-eight lube oil system 
failure modes were compared to the Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL 
baseline which produced eighteen issues. 
leaks from additional components (MDAC ID 195 and 215), failure 
modes for hardware items not specifically covered by the FMEAs 
(MDAC ID 188, 189, 203, 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, and 223), a 
higher criticality for lube oil heaters and thermostats failing 
off (MDAC ID 210, and 211), disagreements about redundancy 
screens (MDAC ID 199, 201, 204, and 214), and other differences 
(MDAC ID 194). 
I 
failure modes were incorporated into the NASA FMEA baseline of 24 
I 
1 
The 
These included external 
The meeting with the NASA subsystem manager on 29 January 1987 
resulted in ten issues which the subsystem manager felt should be 
considered by the APU FMEA/CIL review working group. 
issues were failure modes of the gearbox pressurization system 
(MDAC ID 188 and 195), gearbox oil service couplings (MDAC ID 
199, 201, and 204), gearbox internal relief valves (MDAC ID 216, 
218, and 219), and gearbox accumulators (MDAC ID 221 and 223). 
The IOA recommended individual FMEAs for external leaks from the 
gearbox GN2 bottle and the gearbox pressurization valve. 
F'MEA/CIL working group added these failures as additional causes 
to the existing FMEAs 04-2-MD19-2 and 04-2-GTll-2, respectively. 
These ten 
The APU 
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The IOA recommended an individual FMEA for failure of the lube 
oil filter bypass valve to relieve. This failure mode was 
incorporated into the NASA FMEA baseline of 24  July 1987.  The 
IOA recommended individual FMEAs for the gearbox relief valve 
failing open and failing to relieve. The APU FMEA/CIL working 
group ascertained that failure of this valve in the open position 
would have no effect on the APU, so no additional FMEA was 
warranted. This is in accordance with the general NASA 
philosophy of considering the overall gearbox as one component, 
rather than attempting to write FMEAs for each component inside 
the gearbox. 
The failure of the gearbox relief valve to relieve was judged not 
to be a credible cause for failure of the APU, so again no 
additional FMEA was warranted. 
The IOA recommended FMEAs covering internal leaks in the two 
gearbox accumulators. The APU FMEA/CIL working group ascertained 
that these failure modes would have no effect on the APU, so no 
additional FMEAs were warranted. 
The IOA recommended that the external leak failure modes for the 
gearbox fill, vent, and drain couplings be shown as passing 
redundancy screen A because the couplings are capable of checkout 
and show I1NA1' for Screen B because the cap can be considered 
standby redundancy. NASA reasoned that if the quick disconnect 
coupling itself is not leaking, then there is no way to ascertain 
whether or not the cap will leak, so Screen A is failed. The IOA 
accepts this reasoning. NASA also reasons that the quick 
disconnect is not a standby redundant item, and IOA accepts this 
reasoning. 
During the assessment of the electrical FMEAs (Section 4 . 7 ) ,  it 
was established that a lube oil heater stuck on may lead to loss 
of an APU. Thus, IOA feels that FMEA 04-2 -S18A-2  should show 
criticality 3/1R, since the effect of it, in combination with a 
lube oil heater switch contact failed on, would be to cause a 
lube o i l  heater to be stuck on. 
4 . 4  Gas Generator Injector Cooling Subsystem Assessment Results 
The IOA analysis was based on the philosophy that loss of the 
injector cooling subsystem represented a 1/1 criticality, since 
APU hot restart would be required for a sudden deorbit soon after 
orbit insertion. This produced a large number of 1/1 and 2 /1R 
failure modes. 
The NASA FMEAs reflect the philosophy that the injector cooling 
subsystem is not needed for a normal flight, and that the 
situation described above, where it is needed, constitutes an 
intact abort. Therefore, the criticality for loss of the 
injector cooling subsystem is 3 /3 ,  but is 1/1 for intact aborts. 
The IOA agreed that this is the proper approach to follow in 
assigning criticalities to failure modes of the injector cooling 
subsystem. 
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The IOA analysis produced 23 failure modes for the gas generator 
injector cooling subsystem. 
IOA failure modes and the post 51-L NASA F'MEA/CIL baseline 
produced no issues. 
4.5 Fuel Pump/GGVM Cooling Subsystem Assessment Results 
The IOA analysis was based on the philosophy that loss of the 
entire fuel pump/GGVM cooling subsystem represented a 1/1 
criticality, since in this case the APUs might detonate if 
restarted for a sudden deorbit soon after orbit insertion. This 
produced a substantial number of 1/1, 2/1R, and 3/1R failure 
modes. The NASA F'MEAs reflect the philosophy that this subsystem 
is not needed for a normal flight, and that the situation 
described above, where it is needed, constitutes an intact abort. 
Therefore, the criticality for loss of the entire fuel pump/GGVM 
cooling system is 3/3, but is 1/1 for intact aborts. The IOA 
agreed that this is the proper approach. 
The initial assessment between the 
The IOA analysis produced 31 failure modes for the fuel pump/GGVM 
cooling subsystem. The initial assessment between the IOA 
failure modes and the post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline produced 
six issues, all involving failure modes not covered by the 
baseline =As. These failure modes included external leakage 
from the water relief valve (MDAC I D  248), blockage at the water 
line filter (MDAC I D  261), leakage at the water line flex hose 
(MDAC I D  262), leakage into the water tank isolation valve 
solenoid (MDAC I D  266), and the fail open and fail closed modes 
of the water line check valve (MDAC I D  274 and 275). 
The meeting with the NASA subsystem manager on 29 January 1987 
resulted in all these issues being dropped, due to the overall 
lack of criticality of the fuel pump/GGVM cooling subsystem and 
to the fact that all the failure effects involved could be 
considered to be covered as part of the existing F'MEAs. 
4.6 Structure Subsystem Assessment Results 
During the initial assessment, four structure failure modes were 
compared to the post 51-L NASA F'MEA/CIL baseline, which produced 
two issues, both involving failure modes not covered by the 
baseline FMEAs. These failure modes were external leaks from the 
APU turbine housing (MDAC I D  276) and cracking of the APU turbine 
housing (MDAC I D  277). 
The meeting with the NASA subsystem manager on 29 January 1987 
resulted in these two issues being combined into one failure 
mode, leakage of the APU turbine housing. IOA recommended a 
criticality of 1/1, but the subsystem manager insisted on a 
criticality of 2/1R because the turbine housing is of two-walled 
construction. The resulting failure mode was incorporated into 
the NASA F'MEA baseline of 24 July 1987. 
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4.7 Electrical Subsystem Assessment Results 
The IOA analysis generated 114 failure modes for the electrical 
subsystem (84 original failure modes, plus 30 supplemental 
failure modes generated to match the revised CIL produced by the 
APU EPDC FMEA/CIL review working group). The APU EPDC FMEAs were 
completely re-done, to a greater level of detail, in the FMEA/CIL 
review working group meetings, but only the CIL items were 
available to the IOA for full review. The non-CIL items were 
assessed based on partial information (hardware item 
identification, failure mode, and criticality). 
The initial assessment between the IOA baseline and the NASA APU 
EPDC CIL baseline of 10 July 1987 produced nine issues. These 
issues were provided to the APU EPDC FMEA/CIL review working 
group for consideration. 
The IOA recommended a 3/3 criticality for failure modes resulting 
in lube oil heaters being stuck on (MDAC ID 361, 432X, and 433X), 
since this is the criticality shown in the hardware FMEAs for 
lube oil heaters and thermostats. The working group was aware of 
recent concerns that overheated lube oil might solidify on orbit 
and block lube oil circulation at a subsequent APU restart. 
These FMEAs will remain 2/1R pending the outcome of lube oil 
overheating tests. The hardware FMEAs should match the 
electrical FMEAs, of course, so APU hardware FMEA 04-2-S18A-2 
should be set at criticality 3/1R, rather that 3/3. The IOA is 
showing this as a-eemaining outstanding IOA issue. 
IOA recommended a criticality of 2/2 for open circuit failure of 
the gas generator/fuel pump power isolation diode, The working 
group correctly pointed out that two failures are required to 
cause loss of the redundant heaters for one APU, so the- 
criticality stands as originally established, at 3/2R. 
IOA recommended a new CIL covering the stuck on failure mode of 
the type IV hybrid driver in the gas generator heater power 
circuit, because it is criticality 3/1R and fails redundancy 
screen B (MDAC ID 439X). The working group pointed out that this 
is the thermostat driver and thus would be detectable if it 
failed on, since the heater would be on while the "heater on" 
command from the APU controller was absent. Thus it passes 
screen B and escapes the CIL. 
sequence of failures for the short circuit failure mode of the 
APU controller power circuit switch scan isolation diode (MDAC ID 
429X) and claimed that the failure mode passes redundancy screen 
B. The working group called the control bus voltage difference 
that blows the fuses a second failure, rather than a pre-existing 
condition, meaning that the diode short has no immediate effect 
and is, therefore, not detectable. The IOA concurred with this 
reasoning. The IOA pointed out that a short circuit in the APU 
start circuit circulation pump inhibit circuit is of 1/1 
criticality only in the event of an APU hot restart (i.e., an 
abort), so the criticality should be 3/3, with 1/1 for intact 
The IOA disagreed with the 
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abort. The 
criticality 
working group felt it should keep this FMEA at a 
of 1/1 to emphasize its importance. 
The IOA assessed a criticality of 2/1R for the short circuit 
failure of the tank/fuel line heater power circuit switch scan 
isolation diode (MDAC ID 434X), based on considering a control 
bus voltage difference a pre-existing condition, rather than a 
related failure, and showing redundant heaters failed off as the 
effect. 
difference a related failure, and sets the criticality at 3/1R 
based on a failure sequence leading to a heater stuck on. IOA 
agrees with the NASA FMEA. 
The working group considers the control bus voltage 
As a result of the APU EPDC FMEA/CIL review working group 
meetings, all nine issues were resolved. 
4.8 Displays Subsystem Assessment Results 
During the initial assessment, 10 display subsystem failure modes 
were compared to the post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. 
assessment produced no issues. 
This 
4.9 Instrumentation Subsystem Assessment Results 
The IOA analysis consolidated all 3/3 instrumentation failure 
modes into one FMEA, as allowed by NSTS-22206, Rule 2.3.6.a. 
This is the reason for the large discrepancy in number of F'MEAs 
between the IOA and NASA. 
The IOA analysis generated 10 failure modes-for this subsystem 
(4 original failure modes plus 6 supplemental failure modes). 
The initial assessment between the IOA failure modes and the post 
51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline produced six issues, including the 
gas generator bed temperature sensor (MDAC ID 375) and several 
fuel line temperature sensors (MDAC ID 376, 377, 412X, 413X, and 
417X). 
The meeting with the NASA subsystem manager on 29 January 1987 
resulted in one outstanding issue in this subsystem. The IOA had 
recommended a criticality of 3/1R for failure of the gas 
generator bed temperature sensor (MDAC ID 375), based on its 
importance in the APU logic. 
that this sensor was to be removed from the APU start-up logic 
prior to the next flight. The IOA agreed with the NASA FMEA 
criticality of 3/3. The IOA showed failure modes of the fuel 
test line temperature sensors (MDAC ID 376 and 412X) and fuel 
pump seal cavity drain line temperature sensors (MDAC ID 377 and 
413X) failing redundancy screen C, because redundant sensors were 
mounted on a common clamp. The subsystem manager pointed out 
that this design was to be changed to individual clamps prior to 
the next flight. IOA agreed with the NASA FMEA that screen C was 
passed. 
The subsystem manager pointed out 
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IOA pointed out that no FMEAs existed covering failure of the 
fuel pump bypass line temperature sensors (MDAC ID 417X) which 
the IOA recommended at criticality 3/2R based on possible 
curtailment of orbit activities if insight into fuel line 
temperatures is lost. The subsystem manager agreed that this 
failure mode was not covered, but stated that consideration of 
APU instrumentation FMEAs had been deferred indefinitely to allow 
completion of the review of higher priority FMEAs. This remains 
as an IOA issue pending NASA review of the instrumentation FMEAs. 
4.10 Controller Subsystem Assessment Issues 
The IOA analysis produced 24 failure modes for the APU controller 
(22 original failure modes plus 2 supplemental failure modes). 
The initial assessment between the IOA failure modes and the post 
51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline produced eight issues. One of these 
issues involved a disagreement on criticality (MDAC ID 385), and 
the rest involved failure modes not covered by the NASA FMEA 
. baseline (MDAC ID 381, 386, 387, 391, 396, 397, and 399). 
The meeting with the NASA subsystem manager on 29 January 1987 
resulted in the resolution of all these issues. The IOA had 
recommended setting the criticality of a failed on output from 
the controller high speed control circuit at 2/1R, based on being 
one failure away from APU overspeed. The subsystem manager 
established that an APU overspeed was in actuality two failures 
away, confirming the NASA FMEA criticality of 3/1R. 
With regard to the additional failure modes, the subsystem 
manager pointed out that the current philosophy of the NASA FMEAs 
was to include failures in controller outputs only and to exclude 
purely internal controller failures. He also stated that a 
comprehensive APU controller FMEA would eventually be developed. 
Thus, these seven issues were rejected. The additional failure 
modes included controller power supply failure (MDAC ID 381), APU 
start-up logic output fails off (MDAC ID 386), APU start-up logic 
output fails on (MDAC ID 387), gearbox pressure control output 
f a i l s  on (MDAC ID 391), APU start override logic output fails off  
(MDAC ID 396), APU start override logic output fails on (MDAC ID 
397), and APU injector cooling command fails on (MDAC ID 399). 
The failure modes involving controller outputs can be considered 
covered as part of the existing FMEAs. 
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MC363-0027 
MC450-0017 
Mc452-0147 
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MC477-0262 
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ME271-0079 
ME271-003 0 
Auxiliary Power Unit 
Exhaust Duct 
APU Subsystem Diaphragm Fuel Tank 
H20 Relief Valve 
Fuel Filter 
Fuel Tank Electrical Heater 
Fuel Line Electrical Heater 
Oil Line Electrical Heater 
Remote Power Controller 
Thermal Switch 
150 Milliamp Hybrid Driver Controller 
Time Delay Hybrid Driver 
5 Amp Hybrid Driver Controller 
Water Boiler Quick Disconnects 
Medium and High Pressure Hydraulic 
Hose Assemblies 
Servicing Coupling 
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AOA 
APU 
AT0 
BITE 
CCB 
CIL 
CRT 
DCN 
EGT 
EPDC 
F 
FM 
FMEA 
FP 
FPR 
GFE 
GG 
GGVM 
GN2 
H20 
Hw 
ID 
IOA 
LCA 
MDAC 
MDM 
N2 
NA 
NASA 
NH3 
NSTS 
OMRSD 
PCI 
PCN 
psia 
RTLS 
STS 
STSEOS 
TAL 
WSB 
- Abort-Once-Around - Auxiliary Power Unit - Abort-To-Orbit - Built-In Test Equipment - Change Control Board - Critical Items List - Cathode-Ray Tube - Document Change Notice - Exhaust Gas Temperature - Electrical Power, Distribution and Control - Fahrenheit, Functional - Failure Mode - Failure Modes and Effects Analysis - Fuel Pump - Full Problem Record - Government Furnished Equipment - Gas Generator - Gas Generator Valve Module - Gaseous Nitrogen - Water - Hardware - Identification - Independent Orbiter Assessment - Load Controller Assembly - McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company - Multiplexer/Demultiplexer - Nitrogen - Not Applicable - National Aeronautics and Space Administration - Ammonia - National Space Transportation System - Operational Maintenance Requirements and 
Specifications Document - Potential Critical Item - Page Change Notice - Pounds per Square Inch Absolute - Return-to-Launch Site - Space Transportation System - Space Transportation System Engineering 
- Transatlantic Abort Landing - Water Spray Boiler 
and Operations Support 
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APPENDIX B 
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
B.l Definitions 
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For PreDaration 
of FMEA/CIL, 10 October 1986, were used with the following 
amplifications and additions. 
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS: 
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition 
to OPS 9, post-flight 
- TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at 
transition to OPS 9, post-flight 
- AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at 
transition to OPS 9, post-flight 
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at 
transition to OPS 9, post-flight 
CREDIBLE (CAUSE1 - an event that can be predicted or expected in 
anticipated operational environmental conditions. 
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in 
environmental extremes 
Excludes an 
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond 
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists,.and cue 
cards 
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to 
planned end of mission 
EFFECTS/RATI ONALE - description of the case which generated the 
highest criticality 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality 
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis 
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence 
. (OPS) 
MC 
(PASS) 
MISSION - assignea performance of a specific Orbiter flight with 
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and 
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans, 
middeck P/L, etc.) 
- Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System 
B-2 
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single 
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical) 
function 
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond 
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue 
cards 
- oPS - software operational sequence 
PRIMARY MISSION OEUECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec- 
tives are equal to mission objectives 
PHASE DEFINIT IONS : 
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter 
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff) 
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and 
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT) 
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and 
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8 
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode 
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown 
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear 
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing 
safing operations 
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B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions 
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206. Instructions for 
PreDaration of FMEA/CIL. 10 October 1986,  was employed with the 
following amplifications and additions. 
1. 
2 .  
3 .  
4 .  
5 .  
The operational flight software is an accurate 
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements 
(FSSRs) . 
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of 
this task. 
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system 
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and 
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy 
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item. 
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability 
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew 
is beyond the scope of this task. 
Any data employed w’ith flight software is assumed to be 
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission 
being flown. 
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of 
this task. 
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and 
assembled to the design specifications/drawings. 
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is 
designed to detect and identify problems 
before the item is approved for use. 
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed 
performed as written, and will not include human error in 
their performance. 
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error 
are out-of-scope of this task. 
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6 .  
7 .  
8 .  
9.  
10. 
11. 
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at 
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor 
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater 
hardware detail levels but not lesser. 
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with 
other analyses requires that both analyses 
be performed to a comparable level of 
detail. 
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually 
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not 
required. 
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry 
availability and/or the actual monitoring of 
applicable data by ground-based personnel is 
beyond the scope of this task. 
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the 
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed. 
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in 
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case 
effects for the phase of interest. 
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a 
thorough and complete analysis. 
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors 
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed 
nor FMEAs assessed. 
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior 
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection. 
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected 
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed. 
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior 
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection. 
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and 
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure 
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics. 
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to 
ensure consistency throughout IOA project. 
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B.3 APU-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions 
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level 
of the APU subsystem. 
effects of the hardware or functional failure on the subsystem, 
mission, and crew and vehicle safety. 
The analysis considered the worst case 
1. The APU Controller was analyzed only to the functional 
level. 
RATIONALE: This is in keeping with the NASA and 
Rockwell analyses, and is due to lack of 
adequate data, and resource and schedule 
constraints. 
2 .  Couplings with caps were considered as one unit for 
analysis purposes. 
RATIONALE: This simplified the analysis, and took into 
account the worst case failure (external 
leak). 
3. Switches were analyzed as failing totally open or 
totally closed, regardless of the number of switch 
contacts. For multiposition switches, the analysis 
' considered the worst-case position for failed-on cases. 
RATIONALE: . This simplified the analysis, and took into 
account the worst case failure (failure of 
all contacts is worse than failure of any 
one contact). 
4. Fuel line temperature sensor failures were considered 
criticality 3/3, except in. cases where fewer than 3 
sensors were available to monitor the status of a 
particular fuel line heater. 
RATIONALE: This was to avoid classifying all fuel line 
temperature sensor failures as 3/1R or 
greater, based on loss of detection of a 
failed-on heater. 
5. The APU Fuel Pump/GGVM Cooling System and Gas Generator 
Injector Cooling System failures were assigned 
criticalities based on the effects of the failure 
during a flight situation where these cooling systems 
were required to be used. 
RATIONALE: This approach considered the worst case 
effects of loss of a system - loss of that 
system under circumstances where use of 
the system is required. 
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APPENDIX C 
DETAILED ASSESSMENT 
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated 
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on 
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL 
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets 
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the 
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet 
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens, 
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed 
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies 
noted as trN1t in the compare row under the column where the 
discrepancy occurred. 
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS .................................. 
Hardware Criticalities: 
1 = Loss of life or vehicle 
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item 
3 = All others 
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle 
Functional Criticalities: 
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which, . 
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which, 
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle 
if failed, could cause loss of mission 
Redundancy Screens A, B and C: 
P = Passed Screen 
F = Failed Screen 
NA = Not Applicable 
NASA Data : 
Baseline = NASA FMEA/CIL 
New = Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes 
CIL Item : 
X = Included in CIL 
Compare Row : 
N = Non compare for that column (deviation) 
c-1 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-100 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-GGll-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 100 
ITEM: GAS GENERATOR 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
.[ / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-2 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-101 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-GG11-2 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 101 
ITEM: GAS GENERATOR 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I  * 
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C / 1  C l  c ’  1 [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-102 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-TR12-1 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 102 
ITEM: TURBINE WHEEL 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ - 1  [ I  [ I  [ '  3 
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-4 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-103 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-TRll-11 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 103 
ITEM: TURBINE WHEEL 
.LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ . I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-5 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-104 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-L4-11 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 104 
ITEM: EXHAUST DUCT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
COMPARE / I [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ '  1 
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  - 1  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-105 
NASA FMEA #: 04 -2 -L4 -11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 105 
ITEM: EXHAUST DUCT BELLOWS 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  c 1 . r  1 [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT LIST EXHAUST DUCT BELLOWS AS SEPARATE 
ITEM. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DECISION. 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-106 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-GTll-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 106 
ITEM: GEARBOX 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 1 . c  1 E l  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-107 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-HR13-11 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 107 
ITEM: GAS GENERATOR BED HEATER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ ] ' [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA HAS NEW TEST DATA WHICH SHOWS APU CAN BE STARTED SAFELY WITH 
COLD GAS GENERATOR BED. IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-108 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-HR13-11 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 108 
ITEM: GAS GENERATOR BED HEATER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  ' [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA DID NOT LIST THIS AS A SEPARATE FAILURE MODE. SINCE HEATER 
LOSS IS 3/3 ,  IOA ACCEPTS NASA FAILURE MODE. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-10 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-109 
NASA F'MEA #: 04-2-HR13-11 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 109 
ITEM: GAS GENERATOR BED HEATER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A. B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] c NAI NAI [ NAI 
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA HAS NEW TEST DATA WHICH SHOWS APU CAN BE STARTED SAFELY WITH 
COLD GAS GENERATOR BED. IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-110 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-Slll-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 110 
ITEM: GAS GENERATOR BED HEATER THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C. A B C 
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C N I  E N 1  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
-INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA HAS NEW TEST DATA WHICH SHOWS APU CAN BE STARTED SAFELY WITH 
COLD GAS GENERATOR BED. IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-111 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-S111-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 111 
ITEM: GAS GENERATOR BED HEATER THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I . "  
E l  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-13 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-112 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-MPU1-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 112 
ITEM: MAGNETIC PICKUP UNIT 1 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  . [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS:. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-14 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-113 
NASA FMEA #: 0 4 -2 -MPU2 - 1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 113 
ITEM: MAGNETIC PICKUP UNIT 2 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-114 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-MPU3-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 114 
ITEM: MAGNETIC PICKUP UNIT 3 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B , c  
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 C l  [ : I  C l  C . I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I .  [ 1 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-16 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-115 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-TKll-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 115 
ITEM: FUEL TANK 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ ' 1. [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ : / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-17 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-116 
NASA F'MEA #: 04-2-TKll-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 116 
ITEM: FUEL TANK 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  I 1  [ . I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA LISTED FUEL LEAK AND RUPTURE AS SEPARATE FAILURE MODES. NASA 
COVERED BOTH AS ONE FAILURE MODE. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-117 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-TKll-11 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 117 
ITEM: FUEL TANK 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
COMPARE [ N /N J [ N l .  [ N l  E N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ .  / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA DID NOT LIST THIS FAILURE MODE SEPARATELY FROM FUEL LEAK. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-118 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-TKll-12 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 118 
ITEM: FUEL TANK 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/l!"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-119 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-L3-11 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 119 
ITEM: FUEL TANK GN2 LINE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B . c  
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  C I  [ I  
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ ’ /  1 .  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] - 
I 
I 
I REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-2 1 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-120 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-MD12-13 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 120 
ITEM: FUEL TANK GN2 FILL 
LEAD ANALYST: J. 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] 
IOA [ 2 /1R ] 
COMPARE [ N / 3 
BARNES 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
COUPLING 
SCREENS CIL 
ITEM 
C 
1 1 1  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
c. / 1 [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ -  ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONSIDERED COUPLING AND CAP AS ONE UNIT. NASA CONSIDERED CAP 
AS REDUNDANT ITEM. IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY, AND NASA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-121 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-MD12-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE 3 
NEW X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 12 1 
ITEM: FUEL TANK GN2 FILL COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] c NAI c NAI c NAI c I *  
IOA 3 /3 3 c NAI [ NAI c NAI e 1  
[ I  e 1  e 1  COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
e 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
c / 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-122 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-LVll-11 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 122 
ITEM: FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
1 
1 
1 
I 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
1 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-24 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-123 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-LVll-12 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 123 
ITEM: . FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 
IOA [ 3 /2R ] 
COMPARE [ /N ] 
BARNES 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
A B C 
NASA DATA: . 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  c 1 .  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER FUEL VALVE AS REDUNDANT TO FUEL 
TANK ISOLATION VALVE. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-124 
NASA F'MEA #: 04-2-LVll-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 12 4 
ITEM: . FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  1 1  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  . [  3 
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X J 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-125 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-LVll-10 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 12 5 
ITEM: FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  r 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
r / 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
r x 1  
[ I  
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-126 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-LVll-10 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 126 
ITEM: FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-127 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-LVll-14 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 12 7 
ITEM: FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC A .  B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / 3 [ I  [ N I  r . I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ . I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-128 
NASA F'MEA #: 04-2-PPll-10 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 12 8 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC . A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  c . I  [ I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / .I r 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
I 
I 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-129 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-PPll-11 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 129 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
[ / I  [ I .  [ I  [ .I [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA ANALYSIS. FUEL PUMP EXTERNAL LEAK IS COVERED IN 
HAZARD ANALYSIS, AND THIS IS REFERENCED IN FMEA 04-2-PPll-11. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-130 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-PPll-11 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 130 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
[ / I  ! I  E 3  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-131 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-PPll-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 131 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP BYPASS VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER THIS ITEM SEPARATELY. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-132 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-PPll-3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 132 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP BYPASS VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I  * 
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  c 'I [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-133 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-PPll-11 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 133 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP RELIEF VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c .  / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA DOES NOT ANALYZE RELIEF VALVE AS A SEPARATE ITEM. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-134 
NASA FHEA #: NONE 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 134 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP RELIEF VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA c / 1 
IOA [ 3 /1R ] 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 
BARNES 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
r I *  
[ X I  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  1 1  [ I  [ I  C l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE MODE, DUE TO LACK OF 
EFFECT ON SYSTEM. IOA CONCURS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-135 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2 -PP11-,11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 135 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP RELIEF VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT. ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N I  E N 1  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
c / 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA DOES NOT CONSIDER FUEL PUMP RELIEF VALVE AS SEPARATE ITEM. 
EXTERNAL LEAK OF FUEL PUMP IS COVERED BY HAZARD ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-136 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-FL12-11 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 13 6 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP FILTER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ F l  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] I N 1  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-137 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-FL12-12 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 137 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP FILTER 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 C F I  [ F l  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N I  E l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I  * 
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS; APU OVERSPEED TO DESTRUCTION IS 
WORST CASE RESULT. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-138 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-PPll-11 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 138 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP DRAIN COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA DOES NOT ANALYZE FUEL PUMP DRAIN COUPLING AS SEPARATE. ITEM. 
FUEL PUMP EXTERNAL LEAK IS 2/1R BY NASA ANALYSIS: IOA CALLS IT 
1/1 PER NSTS 22206 SECT. 2.3.3.h. THIS DISCREPANCY IS RESOLVED 
IN ASSESSMENT #129, AND IS NOT CONSIDERED AN ISSUE FOR THIS 
ASSESSMENT. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-139 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-LV12-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 139 
ITEM: PRIMARY FUEL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ F l  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /1R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N / ] [ I  E l  C N I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ 1 .  
. (ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-140 
NASA FMEA #:  04-2-LV12-1 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 14 0 
ITEM: PRIMARY FUEL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  ' E  1 
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-141 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-LV12-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: A W  
MDAC ID: 141 
ITEM: PRIMARY FUEL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I ' /  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-142 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-LV12-1 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 142 
ITEM: PRIMARY FUEL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P  [ X I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
€ 1 1  [ I  E l  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-143 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-V12-13-1 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 143 
ITEM: PRIMARY FUEL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I  * 
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[. / 1 ' 1 .  1 [ I '  [ 1 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-144 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-V12-13-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ -3 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 144 
ITEM: PRIMARY FUEL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C I 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] r NAI NAI r NAI [ X I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 3 r NAI NAI r NAI [ X I  I 
COMPARE [ / ] I 1  1 1  1 1  I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 1  
(ADD/DELETE)‘ 
r /. . I  [ 1 ’ 1  1 [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-145 
NASA F'MEA #: 04-2-LV13-2 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 145 
ITEM: SECONDARY FUEL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I .  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I  * 
[ X I  
[ I  
[ / I  [ I  [ I .  1 C I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-47 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-146 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-LV13-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 146 
ITEM: SECONDARY FUEL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  C N I  [ N l  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-147 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-LV13-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 147 
ITEM: SECONDARY FUEL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-49 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-148 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-LV13-1 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 148 
ITEM: SECONDARY FUEL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-149 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-LV13-2 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 149 
ITEM: SECONDARY FUEL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-51 
c. I" L 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-150 
NASA F'MEA #: 04-2-V12-13-1 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 150 
ITEM: SECONDARY FUEL VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SCREENS 
C 
CIL 
ITEM 
1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  I 1  
* (ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-151 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-L1-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 151 
ITEM: FUEL LINE-UPSTREAM OF TANK ISOL VALVES 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A .  B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ : I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  ' I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-152 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-L1-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 152 
ITEM: FUEL LINE-DOWNSTREAM OF TANK ISOL VALVES 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C - A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ I  .I [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-54 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-153 
NASA FMEA #: 0 4 - 2 -MD11-13 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 153 
ITEM: FUEL TANK HYDRAZINE FILL COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R J [ F I  C F I  [ P I  
IOA [ 1 /1 J NAI NAI c NAI 
COMPARE [ N /N J [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
e 1  I 1  [ I  e 3  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
c / 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
REMARKS : 
INADEQUATE j 
NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED CAP AS REDUNDANT TO COUPLING. IOA 
CONSIDERED COUPLING AND CAP AS ONE UNIT. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-154 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-MDll-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 154 
ITEM: FUEL TANK HYDRAZINE FILL COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ : I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-56 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-155 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-TPll-13 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 155 
ITEM: FUEL LINE TEST POINT COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 C F I  [ F I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 ] r NAI r NAI [ NAI [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  C N I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1. / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONSIDERED COUPLING AND CAP AS ONE UNIT. NASA CONSIDERS CAP 
REDUNDANT TO COUPLING. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-156 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-TPll-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 156 
ITEM: FUEL LINE TEST POINT COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMzhRxs : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-157 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-L1A-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 157 
ITEM: FUEL LINE FLEX HOSE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-158 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-MD13-13 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 158 
ITEM: FUEL LINE HIGH POINT BLEED COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 I N 1  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  E l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA CONSIDERS CAP REDUNDANT TO COUPLING. IOA CONSIDERS COUPLING 
AND CAP AS ONE UNIT. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-159 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-MD13-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 159 
ITEM: FUEL LINE HIGH POINT BLEED COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-160 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-HRll-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 160 
ITEM: FUEL TANK HEATER 
(llA,llB,12A,12B,21A,2lB,22A,22B,3lA,3lB,32A,32B) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  C N I  [ I  E 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX c 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-161 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-SllA-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 161 
ITEM: FUEL TANK HEATER THERMOSTAT. (SllA, SllB, S21A, 
S21B, S31A, S3lB) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I "  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-63 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-162 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-SllA-12 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 162 
ITEM: FUEL TANK HEATER THERMOSTAT (SllA, SllB, S21A, 
S21B, S31A, S31B) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE c / 1 C N I  C I  C N I  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 NASA DATA: 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-163 BASELINE [ ] 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-HR14-11 NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 163 
ITEM: FUEL LINE HEATER (14, 15) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  1 1 -  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-164 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-S16A-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
I SUBSYSTEM: APU I 
MDAC ID: 164 
ITEM: FUEL LJNE HEATER THERMOSTAT I 
(S16A,S16B,S112A,Sll2B,SllA,SllB,S26A,S26B,S2l2A,S2l2B,S2lA,S2lB,S36A,~~ 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C N I  C 3  C N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 1- 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
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I APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-165 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-S16A-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 165 
ITEM: FUEL LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT 
(S16A,S16B,S112A,Sll2B,SllA,SllB,S26A,S26B,S2l2A,S2l2B,S2lA,S2lB,S36A,S3 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
. . FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FVNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] NAI c NAI [ NAI [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  C N I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-166 
NASA FMEA #:  04-2-S14A-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 166 
ITEM: FUEL LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT (REDUNDANT) 
(S19A,S19B,S14A,S14B,S29A,S29B,S24A,S24B,S39A,S39B,S34A,S34B) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [: NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C I  C N I  [ I  [ I  
I RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-167 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-S14A-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 167 
ITEM: FUEL LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT (REDUNDANT) 
(S19A,S19B,S14A,S14B,S29A,S29B,S24A,S24B,S39A,S39B,S34A,S34B) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-168 
NASA F'MEA #: 04-2-HRlll-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 168 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE HEATER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-70 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-169 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-S112A-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [: X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 169 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE HEATER 
THERMOSTAT (S112A,S112B,S212A,S212B,S312A,S312B) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 C P I  C P I  C P I  C I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  C NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  I N 1  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADDIDELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-71 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-170 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-S112A-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 1 
MDAC ID: 17 0 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE HEATER 
THERMOSTAT (S112A,S112B,S212A,S212B,S312A,S312B) I 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: I 
i 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  C N I  C N I  C I  , 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA PLACED CRITICALITY AT 1/1 BASED ON ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL 
RECOMMENDED CIL CHANGE (6/13/86). 
AN ENGINEERING CHANGE TO THE VEHICLE HAS BEEN APPROVED TO 
ELIMINATE THIS PROBLEM. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-72 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-171 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-HR17-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 171 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/VALVE HEATER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 C P I  [ P I  [ P I  C I *  
[ P I  [ NAI [ P I  C l  IOA [ 3 /1R 3 
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  E N 1  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  I' ' C  1 [ I  C I '  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-73 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-172 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-S17A-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 172 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/VALVE HEATER THERMOSTAT 
(S17A,S17B,S27A,S27B,S37A,S37B) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  E l  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ N l  C I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C l  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-74 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
I ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 ASSESSMENT ID: APU-173 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-S17A-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 173 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/VALVE HEATER THERMOSTAT 
(S17A,S17BrS27A,S27B,S37A,S37B) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  C N I  C N I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA).. 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA AGREES WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
I 
I 
I 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-75 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 NASA DATA: 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-174 BASELINE [ 3 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-FLll-11 NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 17 4 
ITEM: FUEL IN-LINE FILTER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 
IOA [ 2 /1R ] 
COMPARE [ / 3 
BARNES 
REDUNDANCY 
A B 
[ F I  [ P  
[ P I  E P  
I N 1  c 
SCREENS CIL 
ITEM 
C 
1 1 1 
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
c / 1  [ I  [- 1 e 1  e 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-76 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-175 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-L1-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 175 
ITEM: FUEL IN-LINE FILTER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  1 '  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-77 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-176 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-FLll-12 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 176 
ITEM: FUEL IN-LINE FILTER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ NAI c NAI NAI 
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / ‘ 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
THIS FAILURE MODE HAS NO EFFECT, DUE TO UPSTREAM FILTER AT FILL 
COUPLING. IOA CONCURS NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-78 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-177 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-L1-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 177 
ITEM: SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  E F I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  E N 1  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
- [  / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS, DUE TO PRESENCE OF FUEL VAPORS IN 
LINE. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-79 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-178 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CLlA-11 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
ITEM: SEAL CAVITY DRAIN FLEX HOSE 
MDAC ID: 178 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  C F I  [ F l  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-80 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-179 
NASA F'MEA #: NONE 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 179 
ITEM: SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
r .  1 * 
[ I  
[ I  
[ / I  C l  [ I  r 'I [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE MODE. 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-81 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-180 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-RVO2-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 18 0 
ITEM: SEAL CAVITY DRAIN RELIEF VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ 'I [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-82 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-181 
NASA FMEA #: 04 -2 -RV02 -2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 181 
ITEM: SEAL CAVITY DRAIN RELIEF VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FWNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ '  1 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. I 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-83 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-182 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-RVO2-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 182 
ITEM: SEAL CAVITY DRAIN RELIEF VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-84 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-183 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-RVO2-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 183 
ITEM: SEAL CAVITY DRAIN RELIEF VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N / 3 [ I  [ N l  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
r / 1  [ I  c I . [ .  1 . [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARXS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-85 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-184 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CLO1-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 184 
ITEM: SEAL CAVITY DRAIN CATCH BOTTLE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  C F I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / J I 1  E N 1  E l  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  C I  C I  [ I  C I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-86 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-185 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-MVO1-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 185 
ITEM: SEAL CAVITY DRAIN CATCH BOTTLE DRAIN VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  C F I  [ F I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N I  [ N I  E N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-87 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-186 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2 -MV01-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 186 
ITEM: SEAL CAVITY DRAIN CATCH BOTTLE DRAIN VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  E l  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ 1 ' [  1 [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-88 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-187 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-PP12-11 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 187 
ITEM: LUBE OIL PUMP 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B .  C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] I 1  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c I '  
(ADD/DELETE) 
c 1 .  1 1 1  E l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 - 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-89 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-188 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2 -MD19 -2 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 188 
ITEM: GEARBOX GN2 BOTTLE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A .  B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] 1 1  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
C / l  [ I  [ I  [ I  ' c  1 
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-90 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-189 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 189 
ITEM: GEARBOX GN2 BOTTLE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/RJNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 1 .  
(ADD/DELETE) 
r / 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) - -  
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA ANALYSIS 
BE CONSIDERED 
CREDIBLE. 
DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS ITEM. THIS FAILURE MODE CAN 
COVERED BY ASSESSMENT #188. SHRAPNEL HAZARD IS NOT 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 
~~~~~~~ 
c-91 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-190 
NASA F'MEA #: 04-2-MD19-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 190 
ITEM: GEARBOX GN2 BOTTLE FILL COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* [  1 
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-92 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-191 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-MD19-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 191 
ITEM: GEARBOX GN2 BOTTLE FILL COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
C / l  [' 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADDIDELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-93 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-192 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-LV14-1 
NASA DATA: 
-BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 192 
ITEM: GEARBOX PRESSURIZATION VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ F l  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA ( 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
I 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
’ (ADD/DELETE) 
I / ‘ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-94 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-193 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-LV14-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 193 
ITEM: GEARBOX PRESSURIZATION VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P I  r ? 1 [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ '  1 [ I  [ I  [ . I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-95 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-194 
NASA FMEA #:  04-2-LV14-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 194 
ITEM: GEARBOX PRESSURIZATION VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 / ' I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADDIDELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-96 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-195 
NASA F'MEA #: 04-2-GTll-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU ' 
MDAC ID: 195 
ITEM: GEARBOX PRESSURIZATION VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / J 1 1  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARXS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-97 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-196 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : ' APU 
MDAC ID: 196 
ITEM: GEARBOX PRESSURIZATION VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
I "  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I . [ ]  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA ANALYSIS DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (BARRIER LEAK). 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-98 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-197 
NASA F'MEA #: 0 4 -2 -L2 - 11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 197 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINES 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / I .  1 1  1 .  [ I  [ .I 1. 
( ADD/DELETE) 
\ 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-99 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-198 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-L2A-l1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 198 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE FLEX HOSES 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B .c 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ /  1 .  [ I  [ I  [ I  
t 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-100 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-199 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-MD14-13 
SUBSYSTEM: A W  
MDAC ID: 199 
ITEM: GEARBOX FILL COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ F l  [ F I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / ] C N I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
[ I  [ I  '[ 1 [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED CAP AS REDUNDANT TO COUPLING. IOA 
ANALYSIS CONSIDERED COUPLING AND CAP AS ONE UNIT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 1 c-101 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-200 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-MD14-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 200 
ITEM: GEARBOX FILL COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ : / I  [ I  I 1  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-102 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-201 
NASA F'MEA #: 04-2-MD14-13 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 201 
ITEM: GEARBOX H.IGH POINT VENT COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ F I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N / 3 [ N l  C N I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  ' I  1 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
- INADEQUATE [ 3 
NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED CAP AS REDUNDANT TO COUPLING. IOA 
ANALYSIS CONSIDERED COUPLING AND CAP AS ONE UNIT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-103 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-202 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-MD14-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 202 
ITEM: GEARBOX HIGH POINT VENT COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
. HDW/F"C A B C 
FLIGHT ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
I REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-104 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-203 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-GTll-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 203 
ITEM: GEARBOX CHIP DETECTOR 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FWNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / I [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER THIS ITEM SEPARATELY. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-105 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-204 
NASA F'MEA #: 04-2-MD14-13 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 204 
ITEM: GEARBOX L O W  POINT DRAIN COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ F l  I F 1  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / 1  [ I  E l  E l  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMAFUZS: 
NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED CAP AS REDUNDANT TO COUPLING. IOA 
ANALYSIS CONSIDERED COUPLING AND CAP AS ONE UNIT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-106 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-205 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-MD14-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 205 
ITEM: GEARBOX L O W  POINT DRAIN COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] 
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] 
COMPARE [ / I 
BARNES 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ .I [ I  E l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-107 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-2-06 
NASA F'MEA #: 04-2-MD17-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 206 
ITEM: GEARBOX HIGH POINT DRAIN COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  C NAI [ P I  
[ P I  C P I  [ P I  IOA [ 2 /1R ] 
C l  C N I  E l  COMPARE [ N / ] 
CIL 
ITEM 
C I *  
C X I  
C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  .I [ I  I 1  C l  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED CAP AS REDUNDANT TO COUPLING. IOA 
ANALYSIS CONSIDERED COUPLING AND CAP AS ONE UNIT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-108 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
/10/86 N- 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-207 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-MD17-1 
A DAT 1: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 207 
ITEM: GEARBOX HIGH POINT DRAIN COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  c . I  
. (ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-109 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-208 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 208 
ITEM: WSB DRAIN COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FTJNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 I N 1  I N 1  E N 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I .  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERS THIS ITEM UNDER HYDRAULIC/WATER SPRAY 
BOILER SYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-110 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-209 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 209 
ITEM: WSB DRAIN COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N I  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
c / i  [ I  E l  1 1  C '  1 
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERS THIS ITEM UNDER HYDRAULIC/WATER SPRAY 
BOILER SYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-111 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-210 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-HR18-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 210 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE HEATER (18A, 18B, 19A, 19B) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  E l  C I  [ I ‘  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-112 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-211 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-S18A-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 211 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT (S18A,S18B) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ N I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / ] . [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-113 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-212 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-S18A-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: A W  
MDAC ID: 2 12 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] C N I  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
I 3./1R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
CRITICALITY MUST BE SET AT 3/1R TO MATCH APU EPDC FMEA; HEATER 
STUCK ON MAY CAUSE LOSS OF AN APU DUE TO LUBE OIL SOLIDIFICATION. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-114 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-213 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-FL13-11 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 213 
ITEM: LUBE OIL FILTER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  ' [ I  E l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-115 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-214 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-FL13-12 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 214 
ITEM: LUBE OIL FILTER 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I "  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ ' /  1 [ I  C I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-116 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-215 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-GTll-11 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 2 15 
ITEM: LUBE OIL FILTER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  - . (ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS ITEM SEPARATELY AS A LEAK 
SOURCE. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-117 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-216 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-FBRV01-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 216 
ITEM: OIL FILTER BYPASS RELIEF VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ F l  C F I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 I N 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-118 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-217 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 217 
ITEM: OIL FILTER BYPASS RELIEF VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  C N I  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: , (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS TO BE A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-119 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-218 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 218 
ITEM: GEARBOX BYPASS RELIEF VALVE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  C N I  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I '  
. (ADDJDELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS ITEM. NO ISSUE, DUE TO LACK 
OF CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-120 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-219 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 219 
ITEM: GEARBOX BYPASS RELIEF VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] I N 1  [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONA'LE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS 1TEM;DUE TO LACK OF EFFECT 
ON SYSTEM. IOA CONCURS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-121 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-220 
NASA F'MEA #: 04-2-GTll-11 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 220 
ITEM: LUBE OIL ACCUMULATOR (ADD-ON) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [: / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION'RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS ITEM SEPARATELY. 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-122 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-221 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 221 
ITEM: LUBE OIL ACCUMULATOR (ADD-ON) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  . [  1 [ '  1 [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
[ N l  
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT COVER THIS ITEM, DUE TO LACK OF EFFECT ON 
SYSTEM. IOA CONCURS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-123 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-222 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-GTll-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 222 
ITEM: LUBE OIL ACCUMULATOR (INTEGRAL) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C l  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ . I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT COVER THIS ITEM SEPARATELY. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-124 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-223 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: A W  
MDAC ID: 223 
ITEM: LUBE OIL ACCUMULATOR (INTEGRAL) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  1 3  [ I  1 1  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT COVER THIS ITEM, DUE TO LACK OF EFFECT ON 
SYSTEM. IOA CONCURS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-125 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-224 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CLV13-2 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 224 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  E l  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-126 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-225 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CLV13-2 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 225 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DEL&TE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-127 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-226 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CLV13-1 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 226 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ NAI c NAI c NAI I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  e x 1  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  C N I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / 1 1 1 1 e 1  
. (ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-128 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-227 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CLV13-2 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 227 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A' . B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
COMPARE [ / 3 I 1  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  r ' I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-129 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-228 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CLV13-2 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 228 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC . A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
COMPARE [ N /N ] E N 1  [ N I  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  c ' 1  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-130 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-229 
NASA F'MEA #: 04-2-CTK01-2 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 229 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER TANK 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  C ]  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARXS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-131 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-230 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CTK01-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 230 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER TANK 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / ,  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-132 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT : 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/ 10/8 6 
APU-2 3 1 
04-2-CGC01-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
APU 
231 
INJECTOR COOLING GN2 FILL COUPLING 
J. BARNES 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ : I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-133 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-232 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 232 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING GN2 FILL COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  C N I  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  C I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE MODE (FAIL CLOSED). 
NO ISSUE, DUE TO LACK OF SYSTEM IMPACT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-134 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-233 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CLO3-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 233 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER LINES (MANIFOLD) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  E l  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-135 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-234 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CLO3-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE 3 
NEW c x J 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 234 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER LINES (MANIFOLD) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E l  [ I  E l  c / 1  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA ASSESSED'CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-136 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-235 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CFD01-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 235 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER FILL COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-137 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-236 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 236 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER FILL COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] C N I  [ N l  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  ( ADD/DELETE) € 3  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE MODE. 
NO ISSUE, DUE TO LACK OF SYSTEM IMPACT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-138 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-237 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CLO3-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 237 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER LINE-APU X 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B 
SCREENS 
- C  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
r I '  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS ITEM SEPARATELY. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-139 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-238 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CLO3-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 238 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER LINE-APU X 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
C 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A - B  
COMPARE I: N /N 3 C N I  C N I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
C N I  
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS ITEM SEPARATELY. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-140 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-239 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CFH02-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 239 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER LINE FLEX HOSE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES’ 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N I  [ N l  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  E l  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-141 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-240 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CHRO1-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 240 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER TANK HEATER 
LEAD ANALYST: 3. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C I  C N I  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
I / 1 -  E l  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ -3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-142 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-241 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CSO1-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
241 
INJECTOR COOLING WATER TANK HEATER THERMOSTAT 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
. HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ /N 1 [ N l  [ I  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  1 ' 3  I 1  1 1  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-143 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-242 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CSO1-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 242 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER TANK HEATER THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ / '  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-144 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-243 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CHR03-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 243 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER LINE HEATER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ /N I C N I  [ I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-145 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-244 
NASA FMEA #: 04 -2 -CS 0 3 -2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 244 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] NAI 1 NAI [ NAI [ I "  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C I  C N 1  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-146 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-245 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CSO3-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 245 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A .B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  1 .  1 
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-147 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-246 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CRVO1-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 246 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING RELIEF VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A. B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ I  E N 1  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  r I -  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-148 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-247 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CRVO1-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 247 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING RELIEF VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  r l ' [  1 [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
. [ ' /  I ,  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-149 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-248 
NASA FMEA #: 04 -2 -CL10-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W C X l  
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 248 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING RELIEF VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  c I ' [  1 [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NASA ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE MODE (EXTERNAL LEAK) 
SEPARATELY. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-150 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-249 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 249 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING GN2 LINE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  C N I  I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N l  
[ / I - [ ]  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NASA ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER THIS ITEM. NO ISSUE, DUE TO LACK 
I 
I OF CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-151 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-250 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CLV15-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 250 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ /N ] I N 1  [ I  [ N l  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 -/ 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE- [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-152 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-251 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CLV15-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 251 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FLMC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N I  [ I  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ X I  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
r I -  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-153 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-252 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CLV15-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 252 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F'UNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
- [  1 
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-154 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/10/86 
APU-253 
04-2-CL10-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
APU 
253 
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING VALVE 
J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ 1 .  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-155 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-254 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CTK06-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 254 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANK 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  C N I  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
- [  1 
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  1 .  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-156 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-255 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CTK06-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 255 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANK 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 r NAI r NA'I c NAI r I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : ( If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) ' 
[ / I  [ '  1 C I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-157 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-256 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CL10-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 256 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER LINES-BETWEEN TANK 
AND TANK VALVES 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC' A .  B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ NAI I: NAI [ NAI c I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  C N I  C N I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ ' I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-158 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-257 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 257 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER LINES-BETWEEN TANK 
AND TANK VALVES 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N I  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE MODE. IOA CONCURS 
WITH NASA - THIS FAILURE MODE IS NOT CREDIBLE. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-159 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-258 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CFD02-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 258 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER FILL COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ NAI [ NAI NAI 
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] C N I  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ 3 [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ 1 - 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-160 
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REPORT DATE 02/18/88 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-259 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 259 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER FILL COUPLING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
[ N l  I N 1  [ N I  r 1  COMPARE [ N /N ] 
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  . I  1 .  I 1  1 3  c 1 .  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS: 
NASA DID NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE MODE. 
OF SYSTEM IMPACT. 
NO ISSUE, DUE TO LACK 
C-161 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-260 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CL10-1 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 260 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COI 
VALVE AND APU 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
G WATER LINES-BETWEEN T 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] C N I  [ N l  C N I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  . [  1 [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
JK 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-162 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 NASA DATA: 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-261 BASELINE [ ] 
NASA FMEA #: NONE NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 261 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER LINES-BETWEEN TANK 
VALVE AND APU 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
I 
i 
I 
1 ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA c / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  r I "  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  [ N l  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 
1 
i 
I 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE MODE (LINE BLOCKAGE 
AT FILTER). NO ISSUE - BLOCKAGE IS COVERED BY FMEA 04-2-CNAO1-1 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-163 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-262 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CFH01-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 262 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER LINE FLEX HOSE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
1 '  / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-164 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-263 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CNA01-1 
SUBSYSTEM: A W  
MDAC ID: 263 
ITEM: SPRAY ORIFICE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL . 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
C / l  [ I  [ I  ' r  1 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
- INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-165 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-264 
NASA F'MEA #: 04-2-CLVO6-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X I  
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 264 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANK VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS . CIL 
, HDW/F"C A B C 
FLIGHT ITEM 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 r NAI r NAI r NAI r I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N I  [ N l  [ N I  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / 1 I '  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) ' 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-166 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-265 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CLVO6-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 265 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANK VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] r NAI [ NAI r NAI r I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N I  [ I  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  [ I  c I . [  1 [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-167 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-266 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CLV13-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 266 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANK VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 I - [  1 [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
'NASA ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE MODE (INTERNAL 
BARRIER LEAK) SEPARATELY. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-168 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-267 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CLVO6-1 
I NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: A W  
MDAC ID: 267 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANK VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
I 
ASSESSMENT: I 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NAI E NAI [ NAI [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  C N I  C N I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) I 
I [ I  (ADD/DELETE) ' [ / I  [ I  E l  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
RE-S : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS I REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. I 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-169 I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-268 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CHRO1-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 268 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANK HEATER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F”C A B C 
COMPARE [ /N 3 I N 1  [ I  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
C I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-170 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-269 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CSO1-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [: X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 269 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANK HEATER 
THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
H D W / W C  A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 NAI c NAI NAI [ I "  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [: /N 3 [ N I  [ I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ ' I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. I 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. I 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-171 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-270 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CSO1-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 270 
ITEM: 
THERMOSTAT 
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANK HEATER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM, 
HDW/F”C A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 C I  C I  C I  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) . 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-172 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT : 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/10/86 
APU-271 
04-2-CHRO3-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
APU 
271 
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER LINE HEATER 
J. BARNES 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B 
SCREENS CIL 
ITEM 
C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ .  1 
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-173 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-272 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CS10-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 272 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER LINE HEATER 
THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
COMPARE [ ’/N 3 C N J  C I  C N I  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-174 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 NASA DATA: 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-273 BASELINE [ 3 
NASA FMEA #: 04 -2-CS 10-1 NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 273 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER LINE HEATER 
THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
I 
I 
I 
a ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ N l  [ I  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-175 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-274 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 274 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CHECK VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ / 1 
IOA [ 3 /1R ] 
COMPARE [ N /N ] 
BARNES 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
ITEM 
, A  B C 
1 I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ I  [ I  [ ' I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER THIS ITEM. NO ISSUE, DUE TO LACK 
OF CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-176 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-275 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 275 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CHECK VALVE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE N /N 3 E N 1  [ N I  [ N I  e 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE '[ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER THIS ITEM. NO ISSUE, DUE TO LACK 
OF CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-177 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-276 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-THll-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 276 
ITEM: EXHAUST PLENUM HOUSING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
c . /  3 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-178 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-277 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-TRll-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 277 
ITEM: , EXHAUST PLENUM HOUSING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  C P I  [ P I  C I "  
[ P I  C P I  [ P I  C X I  IOA [ 2 /1R ] 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  C l  [ I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS ITEM SEPARATELY. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-179 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-278 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-GTll-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 278 
ITEM: EXHAUST PLENUM HOUSING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
( / I  [ I  [ I  [ .  1 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
NASA ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER THIS ITEM SEPARATELY. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-180 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-279 
NASA FMEA #: 04 -2 -GTll-2 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 279 
ITEM: GEARBOX HOUSING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
I 
1 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] 
IOA [ 2 /1R ] 
COMPARE [ / ] 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
A B C 
NASA bATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
[ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) I 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ : I  C l  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-181 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-280 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2035-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 280 
ITEM: "APU CONTROL" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
. (ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-182 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT -ID: APU-281 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6N-2035-1 
SUBSYSTEM: ' APU 
MDAC ID: 281 
ITEM: " A W  CONTROL" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  e 1  c 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / 3 c 3 3 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
e x 1  
e 1  
e 3  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-183 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-282 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2035-2 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 282 
ITEM: "APU CONTROL" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ NAI [ NAI I: NAI [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-184 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-283 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2035-2 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 283 
ITEM: "APU CONTROL" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
COMPARE [ N /N ] C I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ . I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-185 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-284 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2038-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 284 
ITEM: APU CONTROL CIRCUIT GROUND CONTROL INPUT DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 C I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  1 1  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-186 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-285 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2038-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 285 
ITEM: APU CONTROL CIRCUIT GROUND CONTROL INPUT DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ NAI r NAI [ NAI [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] E N 1  [ N l  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  c . I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-187 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-286 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2034-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 286 
ITEM: APU CONTROL CIRCUIT SWITCH POWER FUSE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  C F I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / I [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ . I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-188 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
I 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
II 
1 
I 
1 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-287 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 287 
ITEM: A W  CONTROL CIRCUIT START CONTROL INPUT DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA r / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N I  
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
LATEST DRAWINGS DO NOT SHOW THIS DIODE. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-189 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-288 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2016-1 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 288 
ITEM: "APU CNTLR PWR" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  E l  E l  [ I  [ I  
.(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-190 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8 / 0 5 / 8 7  
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-289 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2016-1 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 289 
ITEM: "APU CNTLR PWR" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  C P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C l  
(ADD/DELETE 
1 1 3  [ I  [ I  [ : I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If -applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-191 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORXSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-290 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2016-2 
NASA DATA: I 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 290 
ITEM: "APU CNTLR PWR'I SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) . 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NASA ANALYSIS ASSESSES CRITICALITY BASED ON A "RELATED FAILURE". 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-192 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-291 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2016-2 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 291 
ITEM: 'IAPU CNTLR PWR" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NAI c NAI NAI 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
1 1 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS ASSESSES CRITICALITY BASED ON A "RELATED FAILURE". 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-193 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-292 
NASA FMEA #: 0S-6N-2017-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 292 
ITEM: CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT RPC 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  E I "  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ : I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-194 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-293 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2017-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 293 
ITEM: CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT RPC 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  I N 1  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  . [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS ASSESSES CRITICALITY BASED ON A "RELATED FAILURE". 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-195 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/65/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-294 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6N-2018-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 294 
ITEM: CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT POWER INPUT DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  r. 1 [ I  
(ADD/ DE LE TE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-196 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-295 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2019-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: A W  
MDAC ID: 295 
ITEM: CONTROLLER POWER SWITCH POWER FUSE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  C I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-197 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMZNT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-296 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2018-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 296 
ITEM: CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT CONTROL INPUT DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  r 1  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-198 
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~I APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-297 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2032-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 297 
ITEM: CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT GROUND CONTROL INPUT 
DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT:. 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-199 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-298 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-200400-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 298 
ITEM: "APU SPEED SELECT" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
. [  / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) . 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THE SWITCH SEPARATELY. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-200 
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APPENDIX c 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-299 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-200400-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 299 
ITEM: "APU SPEED SELECT" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A .  B - c  
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I "  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ NAI r NAI r NAI [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  [ N I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  r I '  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THE SWITCH SEPARATELY. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-201 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 NASA DATA: 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-300 BASELINE [ ] 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-200400-2 NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 300 
ITEM: "APU SPEED SELECT" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ NAI [ NAI I NAI [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 I N 1  I N 1  I N 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ ./  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
I REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THE SWITCH SEPARATELY. 
SCREENS ARE NA BY NSTS-22206, SECT. 2.3.4.b. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-202 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-301 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-200400-2 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 301 
ITEM: "APU SPEED SELECT" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 NAI [ NAI NAI [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ N l  I N 1  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THE SWITCH SEPARATELY. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
SCREENS ARE NA BY NSTS-22206, SECT. 2.3.4.b. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-203 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-302 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-200400-1 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 302 
ITEM: SPEED SELECT CIRCUIT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
I "  
C I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-204 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-303 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-200400-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 303 
ITEM: SPEED SELECT CIRCUIT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [: I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] NAI [ NAI c NAI [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
SCREENS ARE NA BY NSTS-22206, SECT. 2.3.4.b. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-205 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-304 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 304 
ITEM: OVERSPEED/UNDERSPEED INDICATION CIRCUIT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM' 
HDW/F"C A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS ITEM. NO ISSUE, DUE TO LACK 
OF SYSTEM IMPACT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-206 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-305 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2042-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 305 
ITEM: "APU AUTO SHUTDOWN" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B .  C 
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  I N 1  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
1 
I . IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-207 
APPENDIX c 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-306 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2042-1 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 306 
ITEM: "APU AUTO SHUTDOWN" SWITCH 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] c 
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ 
COMPARE [ N / ] c 
RECOMMENDATIONS : ( If different from NASA) 
c / 3  e 1  e 1  1 1  c 3  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. DESIGN CHANGE HAS PROVIDED 
SEPARATE SWITCH FOR EACH APU. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-208 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-307 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2042-2 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 307 
ITEM: "APU AUTO SHUTDOWN" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FVNC A B C 
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  c I -  1 [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-209 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-308 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6N-2042-2 
SUBSYSTEM: A W  
MDAC ID: 308 
ITEM: "APU AUTO SHUTDOWN" SWITCH 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
. HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ 
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ 
COMPARE [ /N ] c 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ : X I *  
[ I  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I - [  1 [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) I 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-210 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-309 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2040-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: A W  
MDAC ID: 309 
ITEM: AUTO SHUTDOWN SWITCH POWER FUSE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC . A B C 
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / 1  [ I  [ ' I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N I  
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. DESIGN CHANGE PROVIDES SEPARATE 
SWITCH FOR EACH APU. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-211 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-310 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 310 
ITEM: AUTO SHUTDOWN CONTROL CIRCUIT DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
. HDW/F"C A B C 
FLIGHT ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  ' I  [ I  [ I  
I 
1 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS ITEM. NO ISSUE, DUE TO LACK 
OF CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-212 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-311 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 311 
ITEM: AUTO SHUTDOWN CONTROL CIRCUIT DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
/ 1 1 1 1 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
rNADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT COVER THIS ITEM. NO ISSUE, DUE TO LACK OF 
CRITICALITY. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-213 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-312 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-201000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 312 
ITEM: FUEL VALVE GROUND CONTROL CIRCUIT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  E l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-214 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-313 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-201000-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 313 
ITEM: FUEL VALVE GROUND CONTROL CIRCUIT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-215 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-314 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2013-1 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 314 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I  * 
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3, 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-216 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-315 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2013-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 3 15 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST:. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  . [  1 
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-217 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-316 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2013-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 316 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 J [ P I  [ P I  [ F l  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. DESIGN CHANGE ADDED CIRCUIT 
BREAKER TO KILL VALVE "ON" SIGNAL. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-218 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-317 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2013-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 3 17 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS . CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A . B  C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  C F I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 3 [ P I  [ P I  c 1 1  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  E N 1  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
- c  1 
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
C / l  [ I  [ I  C l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. DESIGN CHANGE ADDED CIRCUIT 
BREAKER TO KILL VALVE "ON" SIGNAL. 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-219 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-318 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6N-2014-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 318 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE CIRCUIT DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C . A  B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  I "  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  C l  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ : I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ - 1  C l  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-220 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-319 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2014-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 319 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE CIRCUIT DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
- [  / , I  [ I  [ T  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. DESIGN CHANGE PROVIDES THREE 
DRIVERS IN SERIES. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-221 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-320 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2029-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 320 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE AUTO SHUTDOWN DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ /N ] I N 1  I N 1  C N I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ I' [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-222 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-321 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2029-2 
I NASA DATA: BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 321 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE AUTO SHUTDOWN DRIVER I LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
1 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / 1- [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ - 1  
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-223 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-322 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2027-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 322 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH POWER FUSE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  I N 1  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-224 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-323 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2022-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 323 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH OUTPUT DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I  * 
[ X I  
[ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REms : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-225 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-324 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-0115-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ X ] 
NEW r 1 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 324 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE INDICATOR SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 r NAI [ NAI r NAI r I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] r NAI r NAI r NAI r 1  
COMPARE [ / ] C I  C I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
E l 1  [ I  [ I  r 1 -  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-226 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-325 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-0115-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ X 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 325 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE INDICATOR SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ - 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-227 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-326 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 326 
ITEM: "PUMP/VLV COOL" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ X I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON SITUATION WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-228 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-327 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 327 
ITEM: "PUMP/VLV COOL" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC . A  B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] c NAI r NAI [ NAI r I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 c NAI r NAI c NAI [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  ' I  1 [ I  [ I  E l .  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-229 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-328 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 328 
ITEM: I1PUMP/VLV COOL" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
H D W / F C  A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [' NAI [ NAI NAI [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ * /  1 C I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON SITUATION WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-230 
I 
1 
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1 
I 
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I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
1 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-329 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 329 
ITEM: "PUMP/VLV COOL" SWITCH POWER FUSE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
k RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
' [  1 
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I . - [  1 [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON SITUATION WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-231 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM: 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
FUSE 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT : 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
1/06/88 
APU-3 3 0 
05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
APU 
330 
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER 
J. BARNES 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C N I  C N I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  e 1  e 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON SITUATION WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-232 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-331 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 331 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER 
INPUT DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC- A B C 
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  E N 1  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON SITUATION WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-233 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORXSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-332 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 332 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER 
INPUT DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
. HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  C N I  C N I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / I '  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON SITUATION WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-234 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-333 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 333 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT INPUT 
RESISTOR 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON SITUATION WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-235 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM : 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
RESISTOR 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT: 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
1/06/88 
APU-334 
05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
APU 
334 
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT INPUT 
J. BARNES 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C N I  C N I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON SITUATION WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-236 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
11 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-335 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 335 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER 
INPUT DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 c NAI c NAI NAI c I "  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  E F I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  C N I  [ N l  [ N l  
RkOMMENDATIONS : (If. different from NASA) 
C I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
c / 1  C I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON SITUATION WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-237 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-336 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ . 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 336 
ITEM: , FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER 
INPUT DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] C l  C l  C l  c 1  
RECOMMENDATION$: (If different from NASA) 
[ I '  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 1 1  - [  1 [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-238 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-337 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 337 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER 
INPUT DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B c .  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON SITUATION WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-239 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-338 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 338 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT TIMING 
DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  c 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
1 [ I  
1 [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-339 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 339 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING VALVE POWER DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY . REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] r NAI r NAI r NAI [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  E F I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N I  C N I  [ N I  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : ( If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ ,  1 [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
RE-ifAFms : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON SITUATION WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-241 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-340 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 340 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
ING VA 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
IVE POWER DIODE 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 [ NAI [ NAI 1 NAI 
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
[ / I  [ .  1 [ I  E l  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON SITUATION WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-242 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-341 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 341 
ITEM: FUEL PtJMP/GGVM COOLING VALVE INDICATION RESISTOR 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELF.TE ) 
[ / I  C I  I. 1 [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
. INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-243 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-342 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 342 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING VALVE INDICATION RESISTOR 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [. 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-244 
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i 
I 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-343 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 343 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING TANK VALVE POWER FUSE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 r NAI [ NAI r NAI [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  [ N l  [ N I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  r I .  r 1 [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON SITUATION WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-245 
APPENDIX C 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-344 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 344 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING TANK VALVE DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON SITUATION WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-246 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-345 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 345 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING TANK VALVE DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ . I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-247 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-346 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 346 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] C N I  C N I  C N I  [ I  
I 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ .I [ I ’  E l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-248 
APPENDIX C 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-347 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 347 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING THERMOSTAT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-249 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-348 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2055-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 348 
ITEM: "APU HEATER-TANK/F'UEL LINE/H20 SYS" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
I NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. POSSIBLE FUEL LEAK AFTER TWO 
FAILURES REPRESENTS FIRE HAZARD. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-250 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-349 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2055-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 349 
ITEM: APU HEATER, TANK/FUEL LINE/H2O SYS SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  C N I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. DETONATION AND FIRE HAZARD AFTER 
TWO FAILURES. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-251 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-350 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 350 
ITEM: FUEL/HZO HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERS CIRCUIT ELEMENTS INDIVIDUALLY. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-252 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-351 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2059-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 351 
ITEM: F'UEL/HZO HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
[ P I  [ P I  [ F l  C X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ N l  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  C l  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If'applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-253 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-352 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2059-A2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 352 
ITEM: FUEL/H20 HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  I F 1  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 ] r NAI r NAI [ NAI [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIOHALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
ENGINEERING CHANGE HAS BEEN APPROVED TO ELIMINATE 1/1 FAILURE. 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
1 
I 
a 
I 
I 
1 
1 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-353 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2064-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 353 
ITEM: "APU HEATER-GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  C N I  I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
C N 1  
(ADb/DE ZTE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARXS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
WORST CASE SWITCH FAILURE CAN FAIL BOTH SETS OF HEATERS, ALLOWING 
FUEL FREEZING, FUEL LEAK, AND LOSS OF MISSION. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-255 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-354 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2064-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 354 
ITEM: "APU HEATER-GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. STARTING APU TO DISABLE HEATERS 
IS NOT CONSIDERED, PER NSTS-22206, SECT. 2.3.3.f. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-256 I 
APPENDIX C 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-355 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 355 
ITEM: GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N I  [ N l  E N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
c / 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERS CIRCUIT COMPONENTS INDIVIDUALLY. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-257 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-356 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2074-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 356 
ITEM: GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C '  
NASA [ 2 /1R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  C F I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  1 3  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
C / J  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. NO SINGLE FAILURE CAN FAIL 
MULTIPLE DRIVERS ON. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-258 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-357 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2047-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 357 
ITEM: I'APU HEATER, LUBE OIL LINE" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. LOSS OF LUBE OIL HEATERS 
REPRESENTS LOSS OF MISSION. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-259 
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-358 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2047-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 358 
ITEM: "APU HEATER, LUBE OIL LINE" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  r i  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-260 
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-359 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2047-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 359 
ITEM: "APU HEATER, LUBE OIL LINE" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC . A -B. C 
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  C N I  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
, c  1 
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-261 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-360 
NASA F'MEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 360 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A .  B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  I N 1  [ N l  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ ' I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED CIRCUIT COMPONENTS INDIVIDUALLY. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-262 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-361 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2051-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 361 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-263 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-362 
NASA F'MEA #:  05-6N-2024-1 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 362 
ITEM: BITE INITIATE DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B . c  
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 r NAI r NAI r NAI 
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ NAI r NAI r NAI 
* 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  r 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
r 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-264 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-363 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2024-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 363 
ITEM: BITE INITIATE DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 J c NAI c NAI c NAI c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 J NAI c NAI c NAI [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 e 1  e 1  [ I  e 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  E l  [ I  e 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-265 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
I 
I 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-364 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-200900-1 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 364 
ITEM: "APU F'UEL/HZO QTY" 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
GAUGE 
I 
I 
I 
I 
SCREENS CIL 
ITEM 
C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
.I. / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-266 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I '  i1 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-365 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-200900-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 365 
ITEM: "APU FUEL/HZO QTY" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A - -  B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  E l  [ 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA 
[ / I  E l  [ I  [ 
1 [ I  
1. [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
C-267 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-366 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-200900-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 366 
ITEM: "APU F'UEL/HZO QTY" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C . . A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  c 1 .  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-268 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-367 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-200900-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 367 
ITEM: "APU FUEL PRESS" GAUGE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-269 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-368 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-200900-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 368 
ITEM: "APU EGT" GAUGE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-270 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-369 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-200900-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 369 
ITEM: "APU OIL TEMP" GAUGE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ . /  1 [ I . [  1 [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-271 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-370 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-200900-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 370 
ITEM: GAUGING APU SELECT SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  1 1  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  , E  1 [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-272 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-371 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-200900-1 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 371 
ITEM: GAUGING APU SELECT SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY RERUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
. HDW/J!"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ - 1  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-273 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-372 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-200100-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 372 
ITEM: "APU/HYD READY TO START" TALKBACK 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSES SMENT : 
CRITICALITY- 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  E l  [ I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
1 1 1  [ -1 [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-274 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-373 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-200100-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 373 
ITEM: "APU/HYD READY TO START" TALKBACK 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / I [ I  E l  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)' 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-275 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-374 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-0151-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 374 
ITEM: GEARBOX N2 PRESSURE SENSOR V46P0151A(251,351) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/l!"C A .  B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-276 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-375 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-0122-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 375 
ITEM: GAS GENERATOR BED TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
V46T0122A(222,322) 
‘LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F”C A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
[ 
c 
ADD, 
_ _  
- ADEQUATE [ 
INADEQUATE [ 
REMARKS: 
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
1 
1 
1 
DELETE 
1 
1 
A VEHICLE ENGINEERING CHANGE HAS ELIMINATED THIS SENSOR FROM THE 
APU START LOGIC. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-277 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-376 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-0183-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 376 
ITEM: FUEL TEST LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR V46T0183A 
(283,383) V46T0184A (284,384) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ F l  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 C l  [ I  C N I  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
AN ENGINEERING CHANGE HAS BEEN APPROVED TO REMOVE ONE SENSOR FROM 
THE CLAMP - SCREEN C IS PASSED. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-278 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-377 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-0186-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 377 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE TEMPERATURE 
SENSOR V46T0186A (286,386) V46T0170A (270,370) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I "  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ F l  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
AN ENGINEERING CHANGE HAS BEEN APPROVED TO REMOVE ONE SENSOR FROM 
THE CLAMP - SCREEN C IS PASSED. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-279 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-378 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-01XX-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 378 
ITEM: NONCRITICAL INSTRUMENTATION 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
I 1  [ I  1 1  1 1  COMPARE [ / J 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA LUMPED ALL NONCRITICAL INSTRUMENTATION TOGETHER, 
22206, SECT. 2.3.6.a. 
PER NSTS- 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-280 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-379 
NASA F'MEA #: 04-2-CONTL5-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 379 
ITEM: CONTROLLER SAFETY MONITORING 
LEAD. ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ F l  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C / l  1 3  [ I  - I  1 [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-281 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-380 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CONTL5-12 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 380 
ITEM: CONTROLLER SAFETY MONITORING 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
I COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  E l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I - [  1 E l  [ 1 .  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  
I * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-282 
1 
1 APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-381 
NASA F'MEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 381 
ITEM: CONTROLLER POWER SUPPLY 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA I / 1 E l  E l  E l  I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  E l  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 E N 1  [ N l  E N 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  E l  E l  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS ITEM, BECAUSE IT IS INTERNAL 
TO THE CONTROLLER. IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
ADEQUATE 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-283 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-382 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CONTL1-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 382 
ITEM: CONTROLLER PRIMARY SPEED CONTROL 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
' I '  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-284 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I. 
1 
II 
1 
1 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-383 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CONTL1-12 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
ITEM: CONTROLLER PRIMARY SPEED CONTROL 
MDAC ID: 383 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ '  1 [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-285 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-384 
NASA FMEA #: 04 -2 -CONTL2-11 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 384 
ITEM: CONTROLLER SECONDARY SPEED CONTROL 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-286 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-385 
NASA FMEA #: 04 -2 -CONTL2 -2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 385 
ITEM: CONTROLLER SECONDARY SPEED CONTROL 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  I F 1  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N / 3 [ I  [ I  C N I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ '  1 [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-287 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM : 
MDAC ID: 
ITEM: 
LEAD ANALYST: 
ASSESSMENT : 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
12/ 10/ 8 6 
APU-386 
NONE 
APU 
386 
CONTROLLER APU START LOGIC 
J. BARNES 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 I N 1  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS FUNCTION. NO ISSUE; A 
COMPLETE CONTROLLER FMEA IS PLANNED BY NASA. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-288 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-387 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 387 
ITEM: CONTROLLER APU START LOGIC 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 E N 1  C N I  [ N l  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
'E 1 
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  1 1  [ I  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT'CONSIDER THIS FUNCTION. 
COMPLETE CONTROLLER F'MEA IS PLANNED BY NASA. 
ADEQUATE 3 
INADEQUATE ] 
NO ISSUE: A 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-289 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-388 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 388 
ITEM: CONTROLLER "READY" LOGIC 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
I 
I 
I 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B c .  
NASA [ / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ NAI c NAI NAI [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  E N 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 
I 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA ANALYSIS '&ES NOT CONSIDER THIS FUNCTION. NO ISSUE; A 
COMPLETE CONTROLLER FMEA IS PLANNED BY NASA. 
1 
I 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-290 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-389 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 389 
ITEM: CONTROLLER "READY I* LOGIC 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N I  C N I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 3  r 'I [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS FUNCTION. NO ISSUE; A 
COMPLETE CONTROLLER FMEA IS PLANNED BY NASA. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-291 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-390 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CONTL6-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 390 
ITEM: CONTROLLER GEARBOX PRESSURE CONTROL 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 c 3  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. GEARBOX PRESSURE CONTROL 
FUNCTION IS NOT CHECKED OUT BY CONTROLLER BITE. . 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-292 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-391 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 391 
ITEM: CONTROLLER GEARBOX PRESSURE CONTROL 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC , A B C 
NASA [ / 1 [ I. [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  C I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  C N I  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1: / 3 '  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ 1. 
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE MODE. NO ISSUE; A 
COMPLETE CONTROLLER FMEA IS PLANNED BY NASA. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-293 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-392 
NASA FMEA #: 04 -2 -CONTL3 -1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 392 
ITEM: CONTROLLER GG BED HEATER CONTROL 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I . / ]  [ I  
' (ADD/DELETE) 
[ I  [ I .  1 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-294 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-393 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CONTL3 -2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : A W  
MDAC ID: 393 
ITEM: CONTROLLER GG BED HEATER CONTROL 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ NAI [ NAI [ NAI , I .  * 
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ NAI [ NAI [ NAI [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  E l  [ I .  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-295 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-394 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CONTL3-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 394 
ITEM: CONTROLLER GG/FUEL PUMP HEATER INHIBIT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B , c  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  E l  1 .  [ 1 [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-296 
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,I APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-395 
NASA FMEA #: 04 -2 -CONTL3 -4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 395 
ITEM: CONTROLLER GG/FUEL PUMP HEATER INHIBIT. 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B c ,  
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ NAI [ NAI [ NAI [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different .from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
/ ' I  I 1  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH 3/1R, DUE TO LOSS OF ONE OF TWO METHODS OF 
STARTING ONE APU, AND APU REDUNDANCY. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-297 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-396 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 396 
ITEM: CONTROLLER START/OVERRIDE LOGIC 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER THIS CONTROLLER FUNCTION. NO 
ISSUE: A COMPLETE CONTROLLER FMEA IS PLANNED BY NASA. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-298 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-397 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 397 
ITEM: CONTROLLER START/OVERRIDE LOGIC 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/E"C A B C 
NASA [ / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] c NAI E NAI [ NAI [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
7 1 [ I  [ I  E ' I  . [  1 
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER THIS CONTROLLER FUNCTION. NO 
ISSUE: A COMPLETE CONTROLLER FMEA IS PLANNED BY NASA. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-299 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-398 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CONTL7-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: A W  
MDAC ID: 398 
ITEM: CONTROLLER START/OVERRIDE LOGIC 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 I [ NAI [ NAI NAI 
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  E N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ .  1 [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-300 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-399 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 399 
ITEM: CONTROLLER START/OVERRIDE LOGIC 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS . CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  '[ 1 [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS FAILURE MODE. NO ISSUE: A 
COMPLETE CONTROLLER F'MEA IS PLANNED BY NASA. 
IOA WOULD RECOMMEND 3/3, BY NASA APPROACH TO INJECTOR COOLING 
SYSTEM CRITICALITY (1/1 FOR INTACT ABORT) .. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-301 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-400 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 400 
ITEM: CONTROLLER BITE LOGIC 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS' CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C I 
RECOMMENDATIONS : ( If different from NASA) 
c / 3  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DBLETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS CONTROLLER FUNCTION. NO 
ISSUE; A COMPLETE CONTROLLER FMEA IS PLANNED BY NASA. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-302 
I 
1 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-401X 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-HR116-11 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 401 
ITEM: FUEL LINE HEATER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F l  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  C N I  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / .I E l  [ -  1 [ I' 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
1 
I 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-303 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-402X 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-HR10-2 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 402 
ITEM: FUEL VALVE HEATER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ F l  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
' [  1 
( ADD/DELETE ) 
, [  / 1 [ -  1 [ 1 .  [ 1 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-304 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-403X- 
NASA FMEA #: 04 -2 -MD14 -2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 403 
ITEM: GEARBOX FILL, VENT, AND DRAIN COUPLINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: J. 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 
COMPARE [ N / ] 
BARNES 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I .  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
- INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED CAP AS REDUNDANT TO COUPLING. IOA 
ANALYSIS CONSIDERED COUPLING AND CAP AS ONE UNIT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-305 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-404X 
I NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CHFtO1-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU ' 
MDAC ID: 404 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER TANK HEATER 
I LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
I ASSESSMENT: 
I 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NAI NAI c NAI I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  J 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
, IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-306 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-405X 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-CHRO1-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ -  3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 405 
ITEM: . FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANK HEATER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS ' CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ I  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON CONDITIONS WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-307 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-406X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2035-2 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 406 
ITEM:. "APU CONTROL" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
[ADD/ DELETE ) 
c / 3  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-308 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-407X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2031-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 407 
ITEM: CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT CONTROL INPUT DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I '  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-309 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-408X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2014-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 408 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE DRIVER - APU 2,3 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ P I  [ P I  ' 1  p 1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
SAME AS APU 1 DRIVERS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-310 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
I 
I 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-409X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2014-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 409 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE CIRCUIT DRIVER - APU 2,3 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  C F I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ 1. E l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
SAME AS APU 1 DRIVERS. 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-311 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT- ID: APU-410X 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
SUBSYSTEM : ' A W  
MDAC ID: 410 
ITEM: "PUMP/VLV COOL" SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
[ N l  E N 1  C N I  COMPARE N /N J 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 1 .  1 [ I  E l  E l  E l  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON SITUATION WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-312 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-411X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 411 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT TIMIMG 
DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] c NAI c NAI [ NAI c I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ /N ] I N 1  [ N l  [ N I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) . 
[ I  .e 1 . e  1 [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA ASSESSED CRITICALITY BASED ON SITUATION WHERE COOLING IS 
REQUIRED. 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-313 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-412X 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-0183-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 4 12 
ITEM: FUEL TEST LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR V46T0183A 
(283,383) V46T0184A (284,384) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from.NASA) 
[ / I  E l  ’ [  1 [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-314 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
I 
1 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-413X 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-0186-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 413 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE TEMPERATURE 
SENSOR V46T0186A (286,386) V46T0170A (270,370) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE . [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-315 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-414X 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-0104-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 414 
ITEM: FUEL LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR V46T0104A (204,304) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
.COMPARE [ / ] C l  C l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
E I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 1 .  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-316 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 NASA DATA: 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-415X BASELINE [ 3 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-0108-2 NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 415 
ITEM: FUEL LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR V46T0108A (208,308) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
I 
I 
I 
1 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] 
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 
COMPARE [ / 1 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
r I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
I [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  (ADD/ DELETE ) [ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-317 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-416X 
NASA FMEA #: 04-2-0112-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 416 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP OUTLET TEMPERATURE SENSOR V46T0112A 
(212,312) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA ( 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 C l  C l  C l  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ '  1 [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-318 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-417X 
NASA FMEA #: NONE 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 417 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP BYPASS LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
V46T0128A (228,328) 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
NASA ANALYSIS DID NOT CONSIDER THIS ITEM. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-3 19 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/25/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-418X 
NASA FMEA #: 0 4 -2 -CONTL7 -12 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 418 
ITEM: CONTROLLER GG INJECTOR COOLING CONTROL 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  C I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  [ . I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-320 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/25/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-419X 
NASA F'MEA #: 04-2 -CONTL2 -12 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 419 
ITEM: CONTROLLER SECONDARY SPEED CONTROL 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I . [  1 E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ANALYSIS. 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-321 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/04/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-420X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2043-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 420 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE HEATER SWITCH POWER mJSE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  1 x 1  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I .  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-322 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-421X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2015-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 421 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT BREAKER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 1 .  
( ADD/DELETE) [ / I  [ I  E l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-323 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-422X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2018-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 422 
ITEM: CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT POWER INPUT DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 I F 1  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ F l  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-324 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-423X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2022-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 423 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH OUTPUT DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  I F 1  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  E l  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-325 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-424X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2025-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 424 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE GROUND MDM COMMAND DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  E F I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-326 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-425X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2026-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 425 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH OUTPUT RESISTOR 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  C F I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C l  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [. 3 [ I  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
1 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-327 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-426X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2030-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 426 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE AUTO SHUTDOWN DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  C F I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ : I  [ : I  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
I / '  1 [ I  C l  1 1  1 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-328 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-427X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2030A-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 427 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE AUTO SHUTDOWN INHIBIT DRIVER 
POWER FUSE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / 1 . r  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-329 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-428X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2033-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 428 
ITEM: CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT SWITCH SCAN DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  I F 1  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c / 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELF,TE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONRLE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-330 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-429X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2036-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 429 
ITEM: APU CONTROL CIRCUIT SWITCH SCAN DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C 3  c 3  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
C / l  [ I  I 1  1 3  c 3  
* (ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-331 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-430X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2037-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : A W  
MDAC ID: 430 
ITEM: APU CONTROL CIRCUIT CIRC PUMP INHIBIT DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F’UNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
I 
I 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 
1 
I 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
CRITICALITY IS 1/1 FOR ABORT. NASA ANALYSIS SHOWS 1/1 FOR NORMAL 
MISSION TO EMPHASIZE FAILURE MODE CRITICALITY. IOA CONCURS. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-332 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/05/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-431X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2045-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 431 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE HEATER SWITCH POWER DIODE - CR2 
LEAD ANALYST: J. 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] 
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 
COMPARE [ / ] 
BARNES 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
A B C 
[ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
[ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
[ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I  * 
[ X I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
- * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-333 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-432X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2048-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 432 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE HEATER SWITCH SCAN DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-334 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-433X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2050-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 433 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE HEATER GSE DRIVER DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:’ (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-335 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-434X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2056-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 434 
ITEM: TANK/FUEL LINE HEATER SWITCH SCAN DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ F l  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-336 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-435X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2057-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 435 
ITEM: TANK/FUEL LINE HEATER GSE DRIVER DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC . A B - .  C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 C F I  [ F I  [ P I  
IOA ( 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  .[ 1 
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE ( 3 
REMARKS : 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-337 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-436X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2063-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : A W  
MDAC ID: 436 
ITEM: GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP HEATER SWITCH DIODE - CR1, 
CR2, CR3, CR4 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
ITEM 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  C F I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 C I  [ I  C I  c 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-338 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
~I 
‘I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I’ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
U 
I 
I 
I 
~I I APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-437X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2065-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 437 
ITEM: GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP HEATER SWITCH SCAN DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  I F 1  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-339 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/07/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-438X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2066-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 438 
ITEM: GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP HEATER GROUND COMMAND DRIVER 
DIODE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
ITEM- 
CRITICALITY 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS:. (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-340 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I -  
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: . APU-439X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2073-2 
SUBSYSTEM : APU 
MDAC ID: 439 
ITEM: GAS GEN HEATER DRIVER 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
. CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  C F I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  E l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-341 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87 
ASSESS-MENT ID: APU-440X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2074A-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 440 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/LINE HEATER DRIVER - TYPE 3 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ : X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  C F I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
I 
I 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) I 
[ ,  / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
I 
I 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-342 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-441X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2045-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 441 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE HEATER SWITCH POWER DIODE-CR2 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  C F I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  s 1 [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-343 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-442X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2044-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 442 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE HEATER SWITCH POWER RESISTOR 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  E F I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
-[ 1 [ I  E l  1 3  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
1 1 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 c-344 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: APU-443X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6N-2061-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 443 
ITEM: GAS GENERATOR/F'UEL PUMP HEATER SWITCH POWER 
RESISTOR 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
ASSESSMENT: I 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  E l  [ I  [ I  I 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ X ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 1 c-345 
APPENDIX D 
CRITICAL ITEMS 
D-1 
04-2-CFHO2-1 
04-2-CLO1-1 
04-2-CLO3-1 
04-2-CLO3-2 
04-2-CLlA-11 
04-2-CLV13-2 
04-2-CONTL1-12 
04 -2 -CONTL2 - 11 
0 4 -2 -CONTL2 -12 
04-2-CONTL5-1 
04 -2 -CONTL5 -12 
04-2-CONTL6-1 
0 4 -2 -CONTL7 -12 
04-2-CTK01-1 
04-2-CTK01-2 
04-2-FBRV01-1 
04-2-FLll-11 
04-2-FL12-ll 
04-2-FL12-12 
04-2-GGll-11 
04-2-GG11-2 
0 4 - 2 -GT 11 -2 
MDAC-ID ------- 
239 
184 
233 
234 
178 
224 
383 
384 
419 
379 
380 
390 
418 
230 
229 
216 
174 
13 6 
137 
100 
101 
195 
APPENDIX D 
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS 
INJECTOR COOLING 
H20 LINE FLEX HOSE 
FUEL PUMP SEAL 
CAVITY DRAIN 
COLLECTOR 
INJECTOR COOLING 
H 0 LINE AND 
OF VALVE 
INJECTOR COOLING 
FITTINGS 
FUEL PUMP SEAL 
CAVITY DRAIN FLEX 
HOSE 
INJECTOR COOLING 
VALVE 
CONTROLLER PRIMARY 
SPEED CONTROL 
CONTROLLER HIGH 
SPEED CONTROL 
CONTROLLER HIGH 
SPEED CONTROL 
F~TTINGS UPSTREAM 
H20 LINE AND 
CONTROLLER SAFETY 
CONTROLLER SAFETY 
MONITORING 
CONTROLLER GEARBOX 
PRESSURE CONTROL 
CONTROLLER INJECTOR 
COOLING CONTROL 
INJECTOR COOLING 
H20 TANK 
INJECTOR COOLING 
H20 TANK 
LUBE OIL FILTER 
BYPASS RELIEF VALVE 
FUEL IN-LINE FILTER 
FUEL PUMP FILTER 
FUEL PUMP FILTER 
GAS GENERATOR 
MONITORING 
GAS GENERATOR 
GEARBOX 
D-2 
FAILURE MODE 
EXTERNAL LEAK, 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAKAGE 
LEAKAGE 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
STUCK OPEN, 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
PREMATURE OUTPUT 
LOSS OF OUTPUT 
PREMATURE OUTPUT 
(INADVERTENT HOT 
RESTART) 
LOSS OF OUTPUT 
PREMATURE OUTPUT 
LOSS OF OUTPUT 
PREMATURE APU 
START COMMAND 
DIAPHRAGM LEAK 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
FAILS CLOSED 
BLOCKAGE 
BLOCKAGE 
FAILS TO FILTER 
FAILS TO 
FUNCTION 
LEAKAGE 
LOSS OF 
PRESSURIZATION 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
11 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 04-2-GTll-11 
04-2-HR116-11 
04-2-L1-11 
04-2-L1-11 
04-2-L1-11 
04-2-L1A-11 
04-2-L2-11 
04 -2 -L2A-ll 
04-2-L3-11 
04 -2 -L4 -1 1 
04-2-LVll-10 
04-2-LVll-10 
04-2-LV12-1 
04-2-LV12-1 
04 -2 -LV12 -2 
04-2-LV12-2 
04-2-LV13-1 
04-2-LV13-1 
04-2-LV13-1 
04-2-LV13-2 
04-2-LV13-2 
04-2-LV14-1 
04-2-MDll-13 
106 
401 
151 
152 
177 
157 
197 
198 
119 
104 
12 5 
12 6 
14 0 
142 
139 
141 
146 
147 
14 8 
14 5 
149 
192 
153 
04-2-MD12-13 12 0 
04-2-MD13-13 158 
04-2-MD14-13 199 
04-2-MD14-13 201 
04-2-MD14-13 204 
04-2-MPU1-11 112 
0 4 -2 -MPU2 - 1 113 
04-2-PPll-10 12 8 
04-2-PPll-11 129 
04-2-PPll-11 130 
04-2-PPll-11 13 1 
04-2-PPll-11 133 
04-2-PPll-11 13 5 
04-2-PPll-3 132 
04-2-PP12-11 187 
04-2-S112A-2 170 
04-2-51411-2 167 
04-2-S16A-1 164 
GEARBOX 
FUEL LINE HEATER 
FUEL LINE-UPSTREAM 
FUEL LINE-DOWNSTREAM 
SEAL CAVITY DRAIN 
FUEL LINE FLEX HOSE 
LUBE OIL LINES 
LUBE OIL LINE 
FLEX HOSE 
FUEL TANK GN2 LINE 
EXHAUST DUCT 
FUEL TANK ISOL VLVE 
FUEL TANK ISOL VLV 
PRIMARY FUEL VALVE 
PRIMARY FUEL VALVE 
PRIMARY FUEL VALVE 
PRIMARY FUEL VALVE 
SECONDARY FUEL VLV 
SECONDARY FUEL VLV 
SECONDARY FUEL VLV 
SECONDARY FUEL VLV 
SECONDARY FUEL VLV 
GEARBOX PRESS VLV 
FUEL TANK HYDRAZINE 
FUEL TANK GN2 FILL 
Q.D. 
FUEL LINE HI POINT 
BLEED Q.D. 
GEARBOX FILL Q.D. 
GEARBOX HIGH POINT 
BLEED Q.D. 
GEARBOX L O W  POINT 
DRAIN Q.D. 
MAGNETIC PICKUP 
MAGNETIC PICKUP 
FUEL PUMP 
FUEL PUMP 
FUEL PUMP 
FUEL PUMP BYPASS VLV 
FUEL PUMP RELIEF VLV 
FILL Q.D. 
FUEL PUMP RELIEF VLV 
FUEL PUMP BYPASS VLV 
LUBE OIL PUMP 
FUEL PUMP SEAL 
DRAIN LINE 
THERMOSTAT 
FUEL LINE HEATER 
THERMOSTAT 
FUEL LINE HEATER 
THERMOSTAT 
D-3 
FAILURE MODE ------------------ 
LOSS OF OUTPUT 
FAIL OFF 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
LEAK 
LEAK 
LEAK 
LEAK 
LEAK 
BARRIER LEAK 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
FAILS TO OPEN 
INTERNAL LEAK 
FAILS TO CLOSE 
INTERNAL LEAK 
FAILS OPEN 
FAILS MID-POSITION 
INTERNAL LEAK 
FAILS TO OPEN 
INTERNAL LEAK 
FAILS TO OPEN 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
EXTERNAL. LEAK 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
NO OUTPUT 
NO OUTPUT 
INTERNAL LEAK 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
NO OUTPUT 
FAILS OPEN 
RELIEVES AT L O W  
PRESSURE 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
FAILS CLOSED 
NO OUTPUT 
FAIL CLOSED 
FAIL CLOSED 
FAIL OPEN 
04-2-S16A-2 
04-2-S17A-2 
0 4 - 2 - T H l l - 1 1  
0 4 - 2 - T K l l - 1 1  
0 4 - 2 - T K l l - 1 1  
0 4 - 2 - T K l l - 1 1  
0 4 - 2 - T K l l - 1 2  
04-2-TPll-13 
0 4 - 2 - T R l l - 1 1  
04 -2 -TR12-1  
04 -2 -V12-13-1  
04 -2 -V12-13-1  
04-2-V12-13-1  
0 5 - 6 N - 2 0 1 3 - 1  
05 -6N-2013-1  
05 -6N-2013-2  
05-6N-2013-2 
05-6N-2014-2  
05 -6N-2014-2  
05 -6N-2015-2  
0 5 - 6 N - 2 0 1 6 - 1  
0 5 - 6 N - 2 0 1 6 - 1  
05 -6N-2016-2  
05 -6N-2016-2  
05 -6N-2017-2  
0 5 - 6 N - 2 0 1 8 - 1  
05 -6N-2018-2  
0 5 - 6 N - 2 0 2 2 - 1  
05 -6N-2022-2  
05 -6N-2025-2  
05 -6N-2026-1  
0 5 - 6 N - 2 0 2 9 - 1  
0 5 - 6 N - 2 0 3 0 - 1  
05-6N-2030A-1 
05 -6N-2033-2  
05-6N-2 034-1 
05-6N-2035-1  
05 -6N-2035-1  
05-6N-2035-2  
05-6N-2 035-2 
05-6N-2036-2  
MDAC-ID ------- 
165 
173 
276 
115 
116 
117 
118 
155 
103 
1 0 2  
1 4 3  
1 4 4  
150 
314 
315 
316 
3 17 
3 19 
409 
4 2 1  
288 
289 
290 
2 9 1  
293 
294 
422 
323 
4 2 3  
424 
425  
320 
4 2 6  
4 2 7  
428 
286 
280 
2 8 1  
282 
4 0 6  
429  
ITEM 
FUEL L I N E  HEATER 
THERMOSTAT 
FUEL PUMP/VALVE HTR 
THERMOSTAT 
EXHAUST PLENUM 
HOUSING 
FUEL TANK 
FUEL TANK 
FUEL TANK 
FUEL TANK 
FUEL LINE TEST Q.D. 
TURBINE WHEEL 
TURBINE WHEEL 
PRIMARY FUEL VALVE 
PRIMARY FUEL VALVE 
SECONDARY FUEL VLV 
FUEL TANK VALVE SW 
FUEL TANK VALVE SW 
FUEL TANK VALVE SW 
FUEL TANK VALVE SW 
FUEL TANK VLV DRIVER 
FUEL TANK VLV DRIVER 
FUEL TANK VALVE 
C I R C U I T  BREAKER 
-"APU CNTLR PWR" SW 
"APU CNTLR PWR1' SW 
"RPU CNTLR PWR" SW 
"APU CNTLR PWR" SW 
CONTROLLER POWER 
CNTLR POWER DIODE 
CNTLR POWER DIODE 
FUEL TANK VLV DIODE 
FUEL TANK VLV DIODE 
FUEL TANK VLV DIODE 
FUEL TANK VALVE 
RESISTOR 
FUEL TANK VLV DRIVER 
FUEL TANK VLV DIODE 
FUEL TANK VALVE FUSE 
CNTLR POWER DIODE 
APU CNTLR CRCT FUSE 
"APU CONTROL" SW 
"APU CONTROL" SW 
"APU CONTROL" SW 
"APU CONTROL" SW 
APU CNTLR SW DIODE 
FAILURE MODE 
F A I L  CLOSED 
F A I L  CLOSED 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
RUPTURE AT 
OPERATING PRESS. 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
INTERNAL LEAK 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
LOSS O F  OUTPUT 
STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
INTERNAL LEAK 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
EXTERNAL LEAK 
F A I L  TO CLOSE 
F A I L  TO REMAIN 
CLOSED 
F A I L  TO OPEN 
INADVERTENT 
OPERATION 
F A I L  ON 
F A I L  ON 
F A I L  CLOSED 
F A I L  TO CLOSE 
F A I L  TO REMAIN 
CLOSED 
F A I L  TO OPEN 
INADVERTENT 
OPERATION 
F A I L  CLOSED 
F A I L  OPEN 
INTERNAL SHORT 
F A I L  OPEN 
INTERNAL SHORT 
INTERNAL SHORT 
F A I L  OPEN 
F A I L  O F F  
F A I L  OPEN 
F A I L  OPEN 
INTERNAL SHORT 
F A I L  TO CLOSE 
F A I L  TO REMAIN 
CLOSED 
F A I L  TO OPEN 
INADVERTENT START 
INTERNAL SHORT 
F A I L  OPEN 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I D-4 
I 
~1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
~I I 
05-6N-2037-2 
05 -6N-2040-1  
0 5 - 6 N - 2 0 4 2 - 1  
05 -6N-2042-1  
05-6N-2042-2 
05-6N-2042-2 
05 -6N-2043-1  
05-6N-2044-2 
0 5 - 6 N - 2 0 4 5 - 1  
05 -6N-2045-2  
0 5 - 6 N - 2 0 4 7 - 1  
05-6N-2048-2 
05-6N-2050-2 
05 -6N-2051-2  
0 5 - 6 N - 2 0 5 5 - 1  
05-6N-2055-2 
05 -6N-2056-2  
05 -6N-2057-2  
05-6N-2059-2 
05-6N-2059-A2 
0 5 - 6 N - 2 0 6 1 - 2  
0 5 - 6 N - 2 0 6 3 - 1  
0 5 - 6 N - 2 0 6 4 - 1  
05-6N-2064-2 
05-6N-2065-2 
05-6N-2066-2 
05 -6N-2073-2  
05-6N-2074-2 
05-6N-2074A-2 
430 
309 
305 
306 
307 
308 
420 
442 
4 3 1  
4 4 1  
357 
432 
433 
361 
348 
349 
434 
435 
351 
352 
443 
436 
353 
354 
437 
438 
439 
356 
440 
APU CONTROL C I R C  
PUMP I N H  DIODE 
AUTO SHTDWN S W  FUSE 
"APU AUTO SHTDWN" SW 
"APU AUTO SHUTDOWN" 
SWITCH 
"APU AUTO SHTDWN" S W  
"APU AUTO SHUTDOWN" 
SWITCH 
LUBE O I L  L I N E  
HEATER FUSE 
LUBE O I L  L I N E  
HEATER R E S I S T O R  
LUBE O I L  L I N E  
HEATER DIODE 
LUBE O I L  L I N E  
HEATER DIODE 
LUBE O I L  L I N E  HTR SW 
LUBE O I L  L I N E  
HTR DIODE 
LUBE O I L  L I N E  
HEATER DIODE 
LUBE O I L  L I N E  
HEATER DRIVER 
FUEL HEATER S W  
FUEL HEATER S W  
TANK/FUEL L I N E  
HTR DIODE 
TANK/FUEL L I N E  
HTR DIODE 
FUEL/H2 0 HEATER 
DRIVER 
FUEL/H20 HEATER 
DRIVER 
GAS GENERATOR/FUEL 
HEATER R E S I S T O R  
GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP 
HEATER DIODE 
GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP 
HEATER S W  
GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP 
HEATER S W  
GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP 
HEATER DIODE 
GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP 
HEATER DIODE 
GAS GEN HEATER 
DRIVER 
GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP 
HEATER DRIVER 
FUEL PUMP/LINE 
HEATER DRIVER 
FAILURE MODE ------------------ 
INTERNAL SHORT 
F A I L  OPEN 
F A I L  TO CLOSE 
F A I L  TO REMAIN 
CLOSED 
F A I L  TO OPEN 
INADVERTENT 
OPERATION 
F A I L  OPEN 
INTERNAL SHORT 
F A I L  OPEN 
INTERNAL SHORT 
F A I L  TO CLOSE 
INTERNAL SHORT 
INTERNAL SHORT 
DRIVER F A I L  ON 
F A I L  TO CLOSE 
F A I L  TO OPEN 
INTERNAL SHORT 
INTERNAL SHORT 
C I R C U I T  DRIVER 
F A I L  ON 
FUEL PUMP DRAIN 
INTERNAL SHORT 
F A I L  OPEN 
F A I L  TO CLOSE 
F A I L  TO OPEN 
INTERNAL SHORT 
INTERNAL SHORT 
F A I L  ON 
C I R C U I T  DRIVER 
F A I L  ON 
F A I L  ON 
D-5 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I  APPENDIX E DETAILED ANALYSIS 
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing 
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001- 
014, Analysis of the Auxiliary Power Unit, (12 December 1986). 
Prior results were obtained independently and documented before 
starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental analysis 
was performed to address failure modes not previously considered 
by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item being 
analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each 
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and 
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as 
described in NSTS 22206, In structions for PreDaration of FMEA and 
- CIL, 10 October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the 
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at 
the top. 
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS 
Hardware Criticalities: 
1 = Loss of life or vehicle 
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item 
3 = All others 
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle 
Functional Criticalities: 
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which, 
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which, 
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle. 
if failed, could cause loss of mission. 
Redundancy 
1 =  
2 =  
3 =  
NA = 
Redundancy 
P =  
F =  
NA = 
Screen A: 
Is Checked Out PreFlight 
Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight 
Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight 
Not Applicable 
Screens B and C: 
Passed Screen 
Failed Screen 
Not Applicable 
E-1 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/22/86 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 401 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
I FLIGHT: 3/1R ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: FUEL LINE HEATER 
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF, OR L O W  OUTPUT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) A N  
2) FUEL SYSTEM 
3) FUEL LINE HEATER 
4) 
5 )  
6) 
7 )  
8) 
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 3/1R AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R . 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 3 B [NA I 
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT 
PART NUMBER: MC363-0026-0016 
HDW/F"C 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
3/1R 
CAUSES: BROKEN WIRE, THERMOSTAT FAILED OPEN, SHORT CIRCUIT, 
INSTALLATION ERROR 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR HEATING FUEL LINES. IF BOTH HEATERS ARE 
LOST, FUEL CAN FREEZE AND APU MAY BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS 3/1R 
FOR DEORBIT: 2 FAILURES AWAY FROM CRITICAL (1 MORE HEATER AND 1 
MORE APU). 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-2 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/23/86 
MDAC ID: 402 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/ 1R 
ABORT: 3/1R 
ITEM: FUEL VALVE HEATER 
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF, OR LOW OUTPUT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) FUEL SYSTEM 
3) FUEL VALVE HEATER 
4 )  
5 )  
6) 
7 )  
8) 
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/1R AT0 : 3/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 3 B [NA 1 C [ P l  
LOCATION : AFT COMPARTMF,NT 
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001 
CAUSES: BROKEN WIRE, THERMOSTAT FAILED OPEN, SHORT CIRCUIT,. 
INSTALLATION ERROR 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
FOR DEORBIT: 2 FAILURES AWAY FROM CRITICAL (1 MORE HEATER AND 1 
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR HEATING FUEL VALVES. IF BOTH HEATERS ARE 
LOST, FUEL CAN FREEZE AND APU MAY BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS 3/1R 
MORE APU). 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-3 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 2/ 1R 
MDAC ID: 403 ABORT: 1/ 1 
ITEM: GEARBOX FILL, VENT, AND DRAIN COUPLINGS 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) LUBE OIL SYSTEM 
3) LUBE OIL LINES 
4) GEARBOX FILL, VENT, AND DRAIN COUPLINGS 
5) 
6) 
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL : LIFTOFF: 2/1R 
ONORBIT : 2/1R AOA: 
DEORBIT : ' 2/1R AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 3 B [ P l  
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT 
PART NUMBER: MC621-0038-0500 
CAUSES: CORROSION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
1) LOSS OF LUBE OIL. 2) LOSS OF APU DUE TO GEARBOX FAILURE. 
CRITICALITY IS 2/1R DUE TO LOSS OF APU. ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 
1/1 FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF ANOTHER MAIN 
ENGINE. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-4 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/3 0/8 6 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 404 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: INJECTOR COOLING WATER TANK HEATER 
FAILURE MODE: SHORT CIRCUIT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) INJECTOR COOLING SYSTEM 
3) WATER TANK HEATER 
4 )  
5) 
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 AOA: 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/1R AT0 : 3/1R 
. LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 3 B [NA 1 C E P I  
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT 
PART NUMBER: MC363-0025-0002 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION 
EFFECTS/FtATIONALE: 
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR HEATING INJECTOR COOLING WATER TANK. IF 
BOTH HEATERS ARE LOST, WATER WILL FREEZE, AND INJECTOR COOLING 
WILL BE LOST. CRITICALITY IS 3/1R FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU 
COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT COULD CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-5 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/31/86 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 405 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING WATER TANK HEATER 
FAILURE MODE: SHORT CIRCUIT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEM 
3) WATER TANK HEATER 
4) 
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA :. 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 
ONORBIT: 3/3 
AT0 : 3/1R DEORBIT : 3/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B CNA 1 C C P I  
LOCATION : AFT COMPARTMENT 
PART NUMBER: MC363-0025-0002 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CORROSION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF HEATER REDUNDANCY FOR ONE SYSTEM WATER TANK. IF THE 
OTHER HEATER SET IS LOST, THE WATER TANK CAN FREEZE, CAUSING LOSS 
OF FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING REDUNDANCY. CRITICALITY IS 3/1R FOR 
DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL 
TO DETONATE. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-6 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/0 6/87 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 406 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: "APU CONTROL" SWITCH 
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT START/OVERRIDE COMMAND 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) APU CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) "APU CONTROL" SWITCH 
5 )  
6 )  
7) 
8 )  
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 
AOA: 
AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B CNA 1 
LOCATION: PANEL R2 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES : VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION (SHORT) 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
NO EFFECT - APU FUEL TANK VALVES WILL PREVENT FUEL FROM REACHING 
GAS GENERATOR. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-7 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/ 0 6/87 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 407 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT CONTROL INPUT DIODE 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT 
4) CONTROL DIODE 
5 )  
6) 
7) 
8) 
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/F"C 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 
*AT0 : 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA 3 B [NA 1 c [NA 1 
LOCATION: AV BAY 4, 5, 6 (AFT PCA 4, 5, 6) 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
NO EFFECT, DUE TO DIODES IN SERIES WITHIN THE CONTROLLER. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-8 
I 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
I 
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I 
1 
I 
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I 
1 
I 
I 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 408 
1/ 08/ 8 7 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT : 2/1R 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE DRIVER - APU 2,3 
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF, OR SHORT TO GROUND 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) CIRCUIT DRIVER 
5 )  
6) 
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 2/ 1R 
TAL: 2/1R 
AOA: 2/ 1R 
DEORBIT : 3/1R AT0 : 2/1R 
LIFTOFF: 
ONORBIT : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
3/3 
3/1R 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B C P I  C [ P I '  
LOCATION: AFT LCA 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002 
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF REDUNDANT FUEL TANK VALVE: OTHER VALVE ALLOWS APU TO 
OPERATE. CRITICALITY IS 3/1R DUE TO VALVE AND APU REDUNDANCY. 
ABORT: CRITICALITY IS 2/1R FOR ENGINE-OUT ABORTS, WHERE LOSS OF 
ONE APU CAN BE CRITICAL. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-9 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 409 ABORT : 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE CIRCUIT DRIVER - APU 2,3 
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
FLIGHT: 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) CIRCUIT DRIVER 
5 )  
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: 
AT0 : 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/ 1R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
HDW/F"C 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
3/1R 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
HDW/FUNC 
3/ 1R 
3/ 1R 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B C F I  - [ P I  
LOCATION : AFT LCA 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
NO EFFECT, DUE TO TWO OTHER CIRCUIT DRIVERS IN SERIES. IF ALL 3 
DRIVERS FAILED ON, VALVE COULD OVERHEAT AND DETONATE FUEL (FIRE 
HAZARD DURING ENTRY). CRITICALITY IS 3/1R: 2 FAILURES AWAY FROM 
CRITICALITY 1. 
REFERENCES : 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
1 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-10 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 410 
1/ 08/ 8 7 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
2/ 1R FLIGHT: 
ABORT : 2/1R 
ITEM: l'PUMP/VLV COOL" SWITCH 
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS TO GROUND, SHORTS POLE-TO-POLE 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) "PUMP/VLV COOL" SWITCH 
5 )  
6 )  
7) 
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
ATO: 2/18 
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 2/1R 
' LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [ P l  C C P I  
LOCATION: PANEL R2 
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7301 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF ONE OF TWO FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING SYSTEMS. CRITICALITY 
IS 2/1R FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU STARTED HOT CAN 
CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-11 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/12/87 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 411 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/ 1R 
ABORT : 3/ 1R 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT TIMIMG 
DRIVER 
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) 
4) TIMING DRIVER 
FUEL PUMP/GGVM COOLING CONTROL CIRCUIT 
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9)  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F”C 
RTIS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 . 
AOA: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/ 3 
- ONORBIT : 3/3 
ATO: ’ 3/1R DEORBIT : 3/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [ F l  C [ P I  
LOCATION: APU TIMER BOX 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002 
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PIECE-PART MECHANICAL FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
WORST CASE EFFECT IS LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER TO ONE APU COOLING 
VALVE. CRITICALITY IS 3/1R FOR DEORBIT BEFORE APU COOLDOWN. APU 
STARTED HOT CAN CAUSE FUEL TO DETONATE. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-12 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 412 
12/ 3 1/ 8 6 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/ 1R 
ABORT: 3/ 1R 
ITEM: FUEL TEST LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR V46T0183A 
(283,383) V46T0184A (284,384) 
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
SAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
I APU 
I INSTRUMENTATION 
I FUEL TEST LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT ’ HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3. 
AOA: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/1R 
DEORBIT : 3/1R AT0 : 3/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [ P l  C [ F I  
LOCATION : AFT COMPARTMENT 
PART NUMBER: ME449-0160-0003 
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, 
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, HANDLING DAMAGE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
WITH NO TEMPERATURE SENSING, A FAILED-ON HEATER CAN CAUSE FUEL 
DETONATION AND FIRE HAZARD. CRITICALITY IS 3/1R (HEATER FAILED 
ON + 2 SENSORS FAILED = CRITICAL). 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-13 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/31/86 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 413 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE TEMPERATURE 
SENSOR V46T0186A (286,386) V46T0170A (270,370) 
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREARDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) INSTRUMENTATION 
3) FUEL PUMP SEAL CAVITY DRAIN LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
4) 
5 )  
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 
TAL:. 
AOA : ONORBIT : 3/1R 
DEORBIT : 3/1R AT0 : 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING : 3/.1R 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [ P l  
HDW/FUNC 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
3/1R 
C C F I  
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT 
PART NUMBER: ME449-0160-0003 
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, 
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, HANDLING DAMAGE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
WITH NO TEMPERATURE SENSING, AND FUEL IN THE LINE FROM A FUEL 
PUMP SEAL LEAK, A FAILED-ON HEATER CAN CAUSE FUEL DETONATION AND 
FIRE HAZARD. CRITICALITY IS 3/1R (FUEL PUMP SEAL LEAK + HEATER 
FAILED ON + 2 SENSORS FAILED = CRITICAL). 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-14 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/ 05/87 
MDAC ID: 414 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: FUEL LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR V46T0104A (204,304) 
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) INSTRUMENTATION 
3) FUEL LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR 1 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/2R . AOA: .3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 3/3 
WDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 3 B [ P l  C [ P l  
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT 
PART NUMBER: ME449-0160-0003 
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, 
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, HANDLING DAMAGE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR MONITORING OF HEATER STATUS. IF BOTH 
SENSORS ARE LOST, MISSION MAY BE TERMINATED EARLY. 
REFERENCES: 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-15 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/05/87 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 415 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT : 3/3 
I ITEM: FUEL LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR V46T0108A (208,308) FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT 
I 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) INSTRUMENTATION 
3) FUEL LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR 2 
4) 
5 )  
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: ONORBIT : 3/2R 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P l  
LOCATION: AFT COMPARTMENT 
PART NUMBER: ME449-0160-0003 
HDW/FUNC 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 , 
3/3 
C [ P I  
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
1 
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, I 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 1 
I 
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, HANDLING DAMAGE 
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR MONITORING OF HEATER STATUS. IF BOTH 
SENSORS ARE LOST, MISSION MAY BE TERMINATED EARLY. 
I REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-16 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 416 
1/ 05/ 8 7 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP OUTLET TEMPERATURE SENSOR V46T0112A 
(212,312) 
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) INSTRUMENTATION 
3) FUEL PUMP OUTLET TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
4) 
5 )  
6) 
7 )  
8 )  
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 3/3 
WDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P l  C C P I  
LOCATION : AFT COMPARTMENT 
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001-0001 
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, 
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, HANDLING DAMAGE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR MONITORING OF HEATER STATUS. IF OTHER 
SENSOR IS LOST (V46T0128A, 228, 328), MISSION MAY BE TERMINATED 
EARLY. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-17 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/05/87 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 4 17 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP BYPASS LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR V46T0128A 
(228,328) 
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2 ) INSTRUMENTATION 
3) FUEL PUMP BYPASS LINE TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
4 )  
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
PLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F'UNC 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/2R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P l  C [ P l  
LOCATION : AFT COMPARTMENT 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: MANUFACTURING DEFECT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, 
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, HANDLING DAMAGE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR MONITORING OF HEATER STATUS. IF OTHER 
SENSOR IS LOST (V46T0112A, 212, 312), MISSION MAY BE TERMINATED 
EARLY. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-18 
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11 I INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 7/25/87 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 418 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT: . 1/1 
ITEM: CONTROLLER GG INJECTOR COOLING CONTROL 
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE START COMMAND 
LEAD ANALYST: J. .BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) CONTROLLER 
3) GG INJECTOR COOLING CONTROL 
4 )  
5 )  
6 )  
7) 
8) 
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT: . 3/3 , 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA 1 
HDW/FUNC 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
I/ 1 
LOCATION : AV BAY 4, 5, 6 - 
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001 
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, SHORT 
EFFECTS,/RATIONALE : 
PREMATURE START OF HOT APU MAY CAUSE DETONATION OF FUEL IN 
INJECTOiR, WITH SUBSEQUENT FUEL LEAK AND FIRE HAZARD. THIS 
CIRCUIT IS NOT USED DURING NORMAL MISSION. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-19 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 7/25/87 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 419 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: I/ 1 
ABORT: I/ 1 
ITEM: CONTROLLER SECONDARY SPEED CONTROL 
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE OUTPUT - INADVERTENT APU RESTART 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BR 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
SAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
APU 
1 CONTROLLER 
I SPEED CONTROL 
I SECONDARY SPEED CONTROL 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/F"C 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
AT0 : 1/11 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 1/ 1 
.ONORBIT : I/ 1 
DEORBIT : 3/ 3 
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA 3 B [NA 1 c [NA 1 
LOCATION: AV BAY-4, 5, 6 
PART NUMBER: MC201-0001 
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, SHORT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
IF HOT APU RESTARTS INADVERTENTLY DUE TO SPURIOUS OUTPUT TO OPEN 
SECONDARY FUEL VALVE, RESULT COULD BE FUEL DETONATION IN THE 
INJECTOR, WITH SUBSEQUENT FUEL LEAK AND FIRE HAZARD. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-20 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 420 
8/ 04/ 8 7 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT : 3/2R 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE HEATER SWITCH POWER FUSE 
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) LUBE OIL LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) SWITCH POWER FUSE 
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 3/2R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [ F I  C [ P I  
LOCATION: PANEL A12 
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100 
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
NO EFFECT FROM FIRST FAILURE, DUE TO SWITCH CONTACT REDUNDANCY. 
IF FUNCTION IS LOST, MISSION MAY HAVE TO BE CUT SHORT TO AVOID 
LOSS OF APUs DUE TO COLD LUBE OIL. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-2 1 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 421 
8/ 05/ 8 7 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
I FLIGHT: 2/1R ABORT : 2/ 1R 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT BREAKER 
FAILURE MODE: FAIL CLOSED 
I 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) CIRCUIT BREAKER 
5 )  
6) 
7) 
8) 
9)  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: ONORBIT : 2/1R 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [ F I  
LOCATION : PANEL R2 
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030 
HDW/FUNC 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
2/1R 
c r p 1  
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MANUFACTURING DEFECT I 
I EFFECTS/RATIONALE: IF SWITCH ALSO FAILS CLOSED, VALVE IS POWERED CONTINUOUSLY, FUEL CAN OVERHEAT AND DETONATE, LEADING TO FUEL LEAK AND POSSIBLE 
FIRE. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-22 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 422 
8/ 0 5/ 8 7 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT : 3/ 1R 
ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT POWER INPUT DIODE 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT 
4) POWER INPUT DIODE 
5) 
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT . HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R 
LIFTOFF : 3/1R TAL: 3/1R 
ONORBIT : 3/ 1R AOA: 3/1R 
DEORBIT : 3/1R AT0 : 3/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 3 B [ F l  C [ P l  
LOCATION : AV BAY 4, 5, 6 
PART NUMBER: JANTXlN1188R 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
FAILURE OF BOTH DIODES TO ONE APU CONTROLLER TIES TWO MAIN BUSES 
TOGETHER. A SHORT ON ONE MAIN BUS CAN DROP VOLTAGE ON BOTH 
MAINS, LEADING TO LOSS OF ONE APU AND OTHER EFFECTS. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-23 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 
MDAC ID: 423 
8/ 0 5 /  8 7 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH OUTPUT DIODE 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) SWITCH OUTPUT DIODE 
5 )  
6) 
7) 
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC . ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL : 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 3/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [ F l  C [ P I  
LOCATION: AFT LCA 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN5551 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THIS FAILURE PLUS THREE OTHER FAILURES (SWITCH CONTACT SHORTS, 
DIODE SHORTS, SWITCH SHORTS POLE-TO-POLE) CAN CAUSE INADVERTENT 
ENERGIZING OF ISOLATION VALVE. SOLENOID CAN OVERHEAT ON-ORBIT, 
LEADING TO FUEL DECOMPOSITION AND FUEL LINE RUPTURE. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-24 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 8/05/87 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 424 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT : 3/ 1R 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE GROUND MDM COMMAND DIODE 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) GROUND MDM COMMAND DIODE 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/ 1R 
'DEORBIT: 3/3 AT0 : 3/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B C F I  C C P I  
LOCATION : AFT LCA 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN5551 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THIS FAILURE PLUS TWO OTHERS (2 SWITCH CONTACTS FAIL CLOSED, 
CIRCUIT BREAKER FAIL CLOSED) CAN CAUSE INADVERTENT ENERGIZING OF 
ISOLATION VALVE. SOLENOID CAN OVERHEAT ON-ORBIT, LEADING TO FUEL 
DECOMPOSITION AND FUEL LINE RUPTURE. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-2 5 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET I 
I 
DATE : 8/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 3/ 1R 
MDAC ID: 425 ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE SWITCH OUTPUT RESISTOR 
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) SWITCH OUTPUT RESISTOR 
5 )  
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F"C 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/ 1R 
LIFTOFF : 3/1R TAL: 3/1R 
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 3/1R 
DEORBIT : 3/1R AT0 : 3/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [ F l  C [ P I  
LOCATION: AFTLCA1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: RLR42C120GR 
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
FOUR RESISTORS MUST FAIL TO FAIL BOTH FUEL TANK VALVES AND LOSE 
ONE APU. LOSS OF VEHICLE REQUIRES ANOTHER APU FAILURE. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-26 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 8/05/87 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 426 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT : 3/ 1R 
ABORT: 3/1R 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE AUTO SHUTDOWN DIODE 
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) AUTO SHUTDOWN DIODE 
5 )  
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS : 3/1R 
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/ 1R 
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 3/1R 
DEORBIT : 3/ 1R ATO: . 3/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F l  C [ P l  
LOCATION: AFT LCA 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: JANXVlN5551 
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
IN ORDER TO PREVENT APU AUTO SHUTDOWN, TWO DIODE FAILURES PLUS A 
CAUSE SHRAPNEL AND FIRE HAZARD. 
SECONDARY FUEL VALVE FAILURE ARE REQUIRED. OVERSPEEDING APU CAN 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-27 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 8/05/87 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 427 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT: 3/ 1R I 
ITEM: FUEL TANK VALVE AUTO SHUTDOWN INHIBIT DRIVER POWER 
FUSE 
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) FUEL TANK VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) FUEL TANK VALVE AUTO SHUTDOWN INHIBIT DRIVER POWER FUSE 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS : 
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 
DEORBIT : 3/1R AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R 
ONORBIT : 3/ 1R . AOA: 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [ F l  
LOCATION: AFT PCA 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0300 
HDW/FUNC 
3/1R 
3/ 1R 
3/1R 
3/1R 
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF THIS FUSE ELIMINATES AUTO SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY FOR FUEL 
TANK VALVES. APU OVERSPEED REQUIRES FAILURE OF SECONDARY FUEL 
VALVE PLUS FAILURE OF PRIMARY FUEL VALVE. APU OVERSPEED PRODUCES 
SHRAPNEL AND FIRE HAZARD. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
I 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-28 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 428 
8/ 0 6/8 7 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/ 1R 
ABORT : 2/1R 
ITEM: CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT SWITCH SCAN DIODE 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) CONTROLLER POWER CIRCUIT 
4) SWITCH SCAN DIODE 
5) 
6) 
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 2/1R 
TAL: 2/1R LIFTOFF : 3/1R 
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 2/ 1R 
DEORBIT : 3/1R AT0 : 2/ 1R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F l  c r p 1  
LOCATION: AFT PCA 4, 5, 6 
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4246 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
FAILURE OF TWO DIODES REMOVES BUS ISOLATION FROM TWO CONTROL 
BUSES; ANY VOLTAGE DIFFERENCE CAN BLOW ONE FUSE AND LOSE ONE 
CONTROLLER POWER SOURCE. ONE SUBSEQUENT FAILURE CAN LOSE ONE 
APU. LOSS OF ONE MORE APU IS LOSS OF VEHICLE. ABORT: LOSS OF 
ONE APU CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-29 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 8/06/87 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 429 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT : 2/ 1R 
ITEM: APU CONTROL CIRCUIT SWITCH SCAN DIODE 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) APU CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) SWITCH SCAN DIODE 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
F L I G H T  PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F”C 
RTLS: 2/1R 
TAL: 2/1R LIFTOFF : 3/1R 
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 2f1R 
DEORBIT: 3/1R AT0 : -2/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F l  C [ P l  
LOCATION : AFT LCA 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN551 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
FIRST FAILURE TIES ONE CONTROL BUS TO ANOTHER; VOLTAGE DIFFERENCE 
CAN BLOW A SWITCH POWER FUSE. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF SECOND FUSE 
CAUSES LOSS OF ONE APU. LOSS OF ANOTHER APU IS LOSS OF VEHICLE. 
ABORT: LOSS OF ONE APU CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-30 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 8/ 06/8 7 
MDAC ID: 430 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT: I/ 1 
ITEM: APU CONTROL CIRCUIT CIRC PUMP INHIBIT DIODE 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) APU CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) CIRC PUMP INHIBIT DIODE 
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 3/3 
ONORBIT: 3/3 AQA: 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : I/ 1 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA 1 c CNA 1 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
LOCATION: AFT LCA 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN5551 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
SHORTS OVERRIDE START COMMAND TO NORMAL START COMMAND: APU HOT 
START CAN LEAD TO APU PREMATURE START, WITH POTENTIAL FOR 
DETONATION, FUEL LEAK, AND FIRE HAZARD. CRITICALITY IS 1/1 FOR 
ABORT. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-31  
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 8/05/87 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 431 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE HEATER SWITCH POWER DIODE - CR2 
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) 
4) SWITCH POWER DIODE - CR2 LUBE OIL LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
5 )  
6) 
7) 
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: ONORBIT : 3/2R 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F l  
LOCATION : PANEL A12 
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4626 
HDW/FUNC 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
C [ P I  
1 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MANUFACTURING DEFECT I 
1 EFFECTS/RATIONALE: DIODE FAIWJRE PLUS ANOTHER DIODE FAILURE CAN FAIL BOTH LUBE OIL HEATERS ON ONE APU. THIS SITUATION REPRESENTS LOSS OF MISSION. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-32 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : i/ii/aa 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 432 
ITEM: LUBE OIL 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT : 3/1R I 
LINE HEATER SWITCH SCAN DIODE 
SHORT 
SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) LUBE OIL LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) SWITCH SCAN DIODE 
5) 
6) . 
7) 
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/fR AOA: 3/3 
DEORBIT : 31 3 AT0 : 3/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B C F I  c r p 1  
LOCATION: AFT LCA 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN5551 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THIS FAILURE PLUS THREE OTHERS (SWITCH FAIL CLOSED, THERMOSTAT 
FAIL CLOSED, LOSS OF ANOTHER APU) IS LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
OVERHEATING OF LUBE OIL DUE TO HEATER STUCK ON CAN CAUSE OIL 
SOLIDIFICATION, LOSS OF APU. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-33 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 8/06/87 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 433 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE HEATER GSE DRIVER DIODE 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) 
4) GSE.DRIVER DIODE 
LUBE OIL LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
5) 
6) 
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: ONORBIT: 1 .  3/1R 
DEORBIT: ~ 3/3 AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F l  
LOCATION : AFT LCA 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN5551 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
HDW/F"C 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
3/ 1R 
C E P I  
1 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I EFFECTS/RATIONALE: FAILURE OF 2 DIODES ALLOWS ONE SWITCH CONTACT TO ACTIVATE HEATER. IF SWITCH CONTACT FAILS ON, HEATER IS STUCK ON. APU MAY BE LOST. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-34 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/ 11/88 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 434 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: TANK/FUEL LINE HEATER SWITCH SCAN DIODE 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) FUEL/HZO HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) TANK/FUEL LINE HEATER SWITCH SCAN DIODE 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F l  
HDW/FUNC 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
3/1R 
LOCATION:. AFT LCA 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN5551 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THIS FAILURE PLUS TWO OTHERS (SWITCH FAIL CLOSED, THERMOSTAT FAIL 
CLOSED) CAN LEAD TO FUEL DECOMPOSITION AND LINE RUPTURE - 
OVERHEAT DUE TO HEATER STUCK ON. I 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-35 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 8/ 0 6/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 3/1R 
MDAC ID: 435 ABORT : 3/ 1R 
ITEM: TANK/FUEL LINE HEATER GSE DRIVER DIODE 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) 
4) TANK/FUEL LINE HEATER GSE DRIVER DIODE 
FUEL/H2O LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
5) 
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL : 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/ 1R 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 3/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B I F I  C [ P I  
LOCATION: AFT LCA 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN5551 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
TWO DIODE FAILURES ALLOW VOLTAGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONTROL BUSES 
TO BLOW ONE SWITCH POWER FUSE, KILLING ONE SET OF HEATERS. SAME 
FAILURE MODE CAN KILL SECOND HEATER SET, ALLOWING FUEL LINES TO 
FREEZE, WITH POSSIBLE FUEL LEAK AND FIRE. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-36 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 8/06/87 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 436 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT : 3/2R 
ITEM: GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP HEATER SWITCH DIODE - CR1, CR2, 
CR3, CR4 
FAILURE MODE: FAIL OPEN 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) GG/F'UEL PUMP HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) SWITCH DIODE 
5 )  
6) 
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B C F I  
HDW/FUNC 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
3/2R 
c r p 1  
LOCATION: PANEL A12 
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4246 
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THIS FAILURE PLUS TWO OTHERS (DIODE FAIL OPEN, REDUNDANT HEATERS 
FAIL) CAUSES LOSS OF HEATERS FOR ONE APU. MISSION MUST BE 
TERMINATED EARLY. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-37 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORXSHEET 
DATE : 8/07/87 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 437 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
I 3/ 1R FLIGHT: ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP HEATER SWITCH SCAN DIODE 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) 
4) SWITCH SCAN DIODE 
GG/FUEL PUMP HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH : 3/1R RTLS : 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B C F I  
LOCATION : AFT LCA 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN5551 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
HDW/FUNC 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
3’/1R 
I 
I 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
TWO DIODE FAILURES CONNECT ALL 3 FUEL PUMP/VALVE HEATERS TO ONE 
SWITCH CONTACT. FAILURE OF SWITCH CONTACT (SHORTED) PLUS 
THERMOSTAT FAIL ON CAUSES HEATER TO BE STUCK ON. FUEL CAN 
DETONATE, LEADING TO LINE RUPTURE AND FIRE HAZARD. 
I REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-38 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 8/07/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: APU FLIGHT: 3/ 1R 
MDAC ID: 438 ABORT: 3/ 1R 
ITEM: GAS GEN/FUEL PUMP HEATER GROUND COMMAND DRIVER 
DIODE 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) GG/FUEL PUMP HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) GROUND COI"D DRIVER DIODE 
5) 
6 )  
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH : 3/ 1R RTLS : 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [ F l  
HDW/FUNC 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
3/1R 
LOCATION: AFT LCA 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN5551 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
TWO DIODE FAILURES TIE ALL 3 HEATER DRIVERS TO ONE SWITCH 
CONTACT. SWITCH CONTACT FAILURE (SHORT) PLUS THERMOSTAT FAILED 
CLOSED RESULTS IN HEATER STUCK ON. RESULT CAN BE FUEL 
DETONATION, WITH FUEL LEAK AND FIRE HAZARD. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-39 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 439 
8/ 0 6/ 8 7 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/ 1R 
ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: GAS GEN HEATER DRIVER 
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) 
4) GG HEATER DRIVER 
5 )  
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
GG/FUEL PUMP HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 3/3 
3/3 ONORBIT : 3/ 1R AOA: 
DEORBIT: 3/3 AT0 : 3/ 1R 
. LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 J B [ F J  c r p 3  
LOCATION: AFT LCA 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
TWO DRIVERS FAILED ON WILL FAIL ONE HEATER ON. THAT APU WILL NOT 
BE SAFELY STARTABLE, IF INJECTOR COOLING IS LOST. LOSS OF ONE 
MORE APU IS LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-40 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 8/06/87 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 440 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: FUEL PUMP/LINE HEATER DRIVER - TYPE 3 
FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) GG/FUEL PUMP HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) FUEL PUMP/LINE HEATER DRIVER - TYPE 3 
5 )  
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH : 3/1R RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: . 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/1R 
DEORBIT : 313 . AT0 : 3/1R * 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B r F l  c r p 1  
LOCATION : AFT LCA 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE : 
THREE DRIVER FAILURES CAUSE HEATER TO FAIL ON. RESULT CAN BE 
FUEL DETONATION, LEADING TO FUEL LEAK AND FIRE HAZARD DURING 
ENTRY. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-41 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/28/88 
MDAC ID: 441 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT : 3/2R 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE HEATER SWITCH POWER DIODE-CR2 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) LUBE OIL LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) SWITCH POWER DIODE-CR2 
5 )  
6 )  
7) 
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F"C 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 3/3 
DEORBIT: ' 3/3 AT0 : - 3/2R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F l  C [ P I  
LOCATION : PANEL A12 
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4626 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
DIODE SHORT TIES TWO CONTROL BUSES TOGETHER. CONTROL BUS SHORT 
CAN BLOW FUSE, LEADING TO LOSS OF ONE LUBE OIL LINE HEATER. LOSS 
OF NEXT HEATER rs LOSS OF MISSION. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-42 
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 112 818 a 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 442 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT : / 
ITEM: LUBE OIL LINE HEATER SWITCH POWER RESISTOR 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) A W  
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) LUBE OIL LINE HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) SWITCH POWER RESISTOR 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 3/2R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F l  C [ P I  
LOCATION: PANEL A12 
PART NUMBER: RER65F2150M 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
RESISTOR SHORT PLUS DIODE SHORT IN SAME POWER CIRCUIT PLUS 
SHORTED CONTROL BUS KILLS ONE LUBE OIL LINE HEATER. LOSS OF 
REDUNDANT HEATER IS LOSS OF MISSION. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-43 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/28/88 
SUBSYSTEM: APU 
MDAC ID: 443 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
I FLIGHT: 3/2R ABORT : 3/2R 
ITEM: GAS GENERATOR/FUEL PUMP HEATER SWITCH POWER 
RESISTOR 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORT 
LEAD ANALYST: J. BARNES SUBSYS LEAD: J. BARNES I 
BREAXDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) APU 
2) ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
3) GG/FUEL PUMP HEATER CONTROL CIRCUIT 
4) SWITCH POWER RESISTOR 
5 )  
6) 
7 )  
8) 
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
3/3 RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: 
3/3 
PRELAUNCH : 
LIFTOFF : 
ONORBIT : 3/2R 
DEORBIT : 3/3 .AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B C F I  
LOCATION: PANEL A12 
PART NUMBER: RWR8ON619OFR 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
HDW/FUNC 
3/3 
3/3 
3/3 
3/2R 
C I P I  
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
RESISTOR SHORT PLUS DIODE SHORT PLUS CONTROL BUS VOLTAGE 
DIFFERENCE CAN DAMAGE WIRING, CAUSING LOSS OF GG/FUEL PUMP 
HEATER. IF REDUNDANT HEATERS ARE LOST, MISSION MUST BE 
TERMINATED. 
REFERENCES: VS70-460109, ROCKWELL INT. 
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-44 
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APPENDIX F 
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA F'MEA and 
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E. 
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment 
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA 
recommendations. 
Appendix F Resolution/Issue/Rationale Codes 
Code Definition 
1 IOA 
2 IOA 
3 IOA 
4 IOA 
5 IOA 
6 IOA 
recommends a higher criticality. 
recommends an additional failure mode. 
recommends a lower criticality. 
recommends a change to a redundancy screen. 
concurs with NASA analysis. 
generated a non-credible failure mode. 
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